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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-
3(2)(j) UCA (1953). 
By Orders dated September 13, 1990 and March 5, 1991, the 
Supreme Court poured Western's and Smiths' Appeals over to this 
Court for disposition. (900495-CA and 910131-CA) 
On March 19, 1991, both Appeals were consolidated as 900495-
CA. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(Including standards of review and supporting authority) 
1. Do waiver, estoppel and the principle that claims and 
defenses not raised in the trial court cannot be considered on 
appeal preclude Western from denying its responsibility to pay 
Smiths the reasonable value of their professional time and 
services defending Smiths and Western against Plaintiffs' claims? 
The trial court's resolution of legal issues is reviewed 
under a correction of error standard. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 
P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). The Court of Appeals will not consider 
issues not presented to the trial court. Broberg v. Hess, 782 
P.2d 198 (Utah App. 1989). 
2. Does Western's failure to marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's indemnity awards to Smiths for their 
professional defense services and failure to endeavor to 
demonstrate insufficiency thereof require affirmance of the 
awards? 
To attack findings of fact, an appellant must first marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrate 
that even if viewed in the light most favorable to the appellee, 
the evidence is legally insufficient to support them. Doelle v. 
Bradley, supra. 
3. Are the indemnity awards for Smith's professional time 
and services supported by substantial competent evidence? 
The trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, with due regard given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
witnesses. Rule 52(a) URCP and Doelle v. Bradley, supra. 
4. Is the trial court's characterization of Smith's defense 
time as indemnifiable expense under Section 16-10-4[o](3) UCA 
(1953) (now Section 16-10-4(2)(c)) a proper application of the 
statute in accord with its purpose? 
The trial court's resolution of legal issues is reviewed 
under a correction of error standard. Doelle v. Bradley, supra. 
5. Is Western entitled to take Smith's expert accounting 
defense services without paying for them? 
If there is a reasonable basis in the evidence, a trial 
courts award of damages will be affirmed on appeal. Gillmor v. 
Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987). 
6. Does Western's failure to marshall the evidence 
supporting the trial court's indemnity award to Smiths for 
reasonable attorney's fees for their defense and failure to 
endeavor to demonstrate insufficiency thereof require affirmance 
of the award? 
To attack findings of fact, an appellant must marshall the 
supporting evidence and demonstrate its insufficiency. Doelle v. 
Bradley, supra. 
7. Is the indemnity awarded for reasonable attorney's fees 
for Smith's defense supported by substantial evidence? 
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous. Rule 52(a) URCP and Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 
(Utah 1989). 
8. Was pre-judgment interest properly allowed on the 
indemnity awarded? 
The trial court's determination of legal issues is reviewed 
under a correction of error standard. Doelle v. Bradley, supra. 
9. Are Smiths entitled to recover their costs of seeking 
indemnif ication? 
The trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed under a 
correction of error standard. Doelle v. Bradley, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
The determinative statute is the indemnification section of 
Utah Corporation Code, Section 16-10-4(o) UCA (1953), 
particularly subparagraph (3). In 1987 this statute was amended 
in grammatical form, but not in substance. The indemnification 
statute now appears as Section 16-10-4(2) UCA (1953). 
Subparagraph (3) of the pre-1987 version was continued as 
subparagraph (c) of the amended statute with only inconsequential 
grammatical changes. 
Section 16-10-4(o), Utah Code Annotated (1953) is set forth 
in full in Addendum I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Defendant, Appellant and Cross Appellee Western Auto 
Radiator Co., Inc., "Western", is a closely held Utah corporation 
long engaged in the business of repairing radiators and air 
conditioner systems in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Prior to December 1977, Western had one class of common 
stock (except for one share issued to Defendant, Appellee and 
Cross Appellant Willard L. Smith) all of which was owned by 
Defendant William W. Bowerbank, "Bowerbank". 
Late in 1977 a means was developed, with the aid of CPA 
Willard L. Smith, who had long served Western's accounting, tax 
reporting and business advice needs, by which Western's employees 
could purchase Western's stock from Bowerbank with Western's 
profits. 
In December 1977, four of Western's employees, Plaintiffs 
Blaine Goodrich, David L. Hoyt, Val G. Kidman and Sterling C. 
Jones, contracted with Bowerbank to purchase his preferred stock 
for $200,000.00 payable over ten years. 
In January 1982, the same four employees and one additional 
employee, Plaintiff Daniel Wayman, contracted with Bowerbank to 
purchase his common stock for $100,000.00, payable over time. 
Western agreed to pay monthly bonuses to the purchasers 
sufficient to make all stock purchase payments. 
The 1982 agreement established a contractual board of 
directors and officers. The contract directors were two of the 
purchasing employees, Blaine Goodrich and Daniel Wayman, stock 
seller Bowerbank's two sons, Jonathan and Kim Bowerbank and two 
independent CPA's, Defendants, Appellees and Cross Appellants 
Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith ("Smiths"). The contract 
officers were Willard L. Smith, President and Chairman of the 
Board of Directors, Jonathan Bowerbank, Vice President, Blaine 
Goodrich, Secretary and Keith C. Smith, Treasurer. 
The 1982 agreement provided Western would provide Bowerbank 
an automobile, fringe benefits, and could use his services as a 
consultant for reasonable compensation. 
A consulting agreement was signed by Bowerbank and Western 
under which Bowerbank agreed to assist Western in various ways 
for $500.00 per month. 
Under an additional January 1982 contract, Bowerbank sold 
Western the land and building Western had been renting. The 
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price was made payable over fifteen years. 
Western continued to operate profitably. Smiths 
administered performance of the contracts, accrued stock purchase 
bonuses to the purchasing employees and paid them to Bowerbank. 
(R. 246) 
The purchasing employees grew resentful of Bowerbank's 
continued observations, criticisms, and demands (Tr. 1091, 1116-
1127), and, in an effort to obtain sole control of Western, (Tr. 
1126-1129), in February 1984 filed a complaint against Western, 
Bowerbank, Bowerbank1s two director sons, and Willard and Keith 
Smith, claiming Bowerbank would not permit Plaintiffs to control 
the affairs of Western; that certificates showing more shares of 
preferred stock had been delivered to them than the corporation 
had issued to Bowerbank; that such certificates were ultra vires 
or watered stock and that an accounting was necessary. An order 
was sought compelling Bowerbank to deposit his common stock with 
the clerk of the court. (R. 2-11) 
Course Of Proceedings 
By amended complaint, the purchasing employees claimed that 
Smiths and Bowerbank's director sons had fraudulently diverted 
Western's assets; permitted Kim Bowerbank to purchase a Western 
vehicle for less than its value; had Western provide insurance 
for the automobile after it was sold; had Western sell a Western 
vehicle to Jonathan Bowerbank for less than its value; had 
Western provide insurance and repairs for the automobile after it 
was sold; had Western provide health insurance to Jonathan 
Bowerbank; paid Willard L. Smith $2,000.00 per year, Kim 
Bowerbank and Jonathan Bowerbank $1,000.00 per year, and Keith 
Smith $500.00 per year as director fees without receiving 
services; that Willard Smith and Bowerbank changed a stock 
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purchase payment due date causing Western to pay $14,402.00 to 
Bowerbank a year early; that the January 1982 consulting 
agreement was kept secret from the purchasing employees; that 
Bowerbank provided no consulting services for his consulting 
fees; that Bowerbank directly and through directors Smith and 
Bowerbank1s sons had excluded the purchasing employees from 
managing Western; that certificates for 171,712 preferred shares 
had been delivered to Plaintiffs, and claimed directors 
Bowerbank and Smith had conspired to issued watered stock. (R. 
40) 
The answer to Plaintiff's amended complaint filed by counsel 
(Watkiss and Campbell) for the three Bowerbank defendants was 
also filed on behalf of Western. (R. 66) 
Smiths separately answered, and by counterclaim and 
crossclaim asserted their defenses and sought recovery of their 
defense expenses and time against the purchasing employee 
Plaintiffs and also against Western. (R. 84, R.89) 
On September 19, 1984 Western adopted a resolution by 
majority vote (the two Plaintiff directors voting against it) 
stating that Defendant officer/directors acted in good faith and 
in the best interests of Western with respect to the matters 
alleged in the purchasing employees amended complaint which 
authorized indemnification of Defendant officer/directors 
against attorney's fees, costs and expenses. (Ex. 1 p. 635-
637). 
In November 1985, Plaintiffs filed a second amended 
complaint alleging a number of Western checks were improperly 
paid to Bowerbank, claiming Willard L. Smith conspired with 
Bowerbank to set the price for Bowerbank's land and building 
above market value and asserting the contract price should be 
reduced or else judgment should be entered against Willard L. 
Smith personally for $155,000. (R. 217) 
In the pre-trial order (R. 230) the purchasing employees 
claimed Defendant Willard L. Smith, Bowerbank and an attorney had 
represented that Plaintiffs would be purchasing 200,000 shares of 
preferred stock for $1.00 per share and 100,000 shares of common 
stock; that the purchasing employees should have an accounting of 
all payments made to Bowerbank under the 1977 and 1982 
agreements; that some payments had been doubled requiring a 
recomputation of interest; that Bowerbank or Willard L. Smith 
should contribute additional capital to Western at the rate of 
$1.00 per share for 300,000 shares (R. 248); that the land and 
building price should be reduced; that the consulting agreement 
should be rescinded; and that Directors Smith and Bowerbank's 
sons functioned as Bowerbank's alter egos and had breached their 
fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs in various respects and had not 
earned their directors fees. (R. 230-237) 
In the pre-trial order, Smiths asserted their defenses and 
claimed entitlement to defense costs and attorney's fees and 
reasonable charges for their professional time consumed in 
preparing accounting summaries and doing other work defending 
the litigation, and Western adopted, by reference, all of the 
claims and defenses of Smiths and Bowerbank. (R. 242-43) 
Western did not oppose Smiths' indemnification claim against 
Western for Smiths' costs, attorney's fees and their professional 
time consumed in defending the litigation. (R. 243-244) 
Initial Disposition In Court Below 
And Subsequent Proceedings 
Trial commenced before the Honorable Dean E. Conder December 
10, 1985 and continued on December 11 and 13, 1985 and January 8, 
1986. Before the purchasing employees concluded presentation of 
their evidence, Trial Judge Dean E. Conder strongly suggested to 
the purchasing employees and Bowerbank that a settlement should 
be made. (Tr. 1181-82) 
With that impetus, Bowerbank and the five purchasing 
employee Plaintiffs, with the acquiescence of Western and 
Bowerbank's two director sons, worked out a settlement with 
Bowerbank on January 9, 1985. (Tr. 1198-1211; R. 391-402) 
The purchasing employees withdrew and abandoned all claims, 
including those made against Smiths. (R. 398) The settlement 
contemplated the purchasing employees would vote in directors 
when they received Western's common stock. (Tr. 1208) 
No agreement was made with Smiths as to their claim for 
costs, attorney's fees and reasonable charges for their 
professional time and extensive accounting services in defending 
the litigation. It was stipulated that the court would determine 
those matters based on the evidence heard to that point and upon 
proffers of evidence and memoranda to be submitted by the 
purchasing employees and Smiths. (R. 410-413) 
Proffers of additional evidence concerning Smiths' 
indemnification claims were made. (Tr. 1183-1194) 
Supplemental affidavits and memorandums on the 
indemnification and related issues were submitted. (R. 417-510) 
The court granted Smiths judgment against Western only. (R. 
501, 530-531) 
Control of Western passed to Plaintiffs by reason of the 
settlement. 
Plaintiffs' counsel, now representing Western, filed an 
appeal from Smiths' judgment. (R. 533) 
By Amended Memorandum Decision filed May 9, 1988, this Court 
determined the Trial Court's Findings inadequate and remanded the 
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case for such further proceedings and reassessment of the award 
as should be appropriate in view of its' comments and for the 
entry of suitable findings. (R. 1265-69) 
Following remand, Smiths responded to a motion made by 
Western for release of a supersedeas bond substitute (R. 1255; 
1258-1301) and responded to written discovery requests made by 
Western. (R. 1660-1752) As part of Smiths' written responses 
Smiths annexed comprehensive summaries of their litigation 
defense services. (R. 1696-1708; 1742-52) Additional sworn 
written evidence was submitted by Smiths by means of an 
Affidavit of Keith C. Smith (R. 1385-1481) and an Affidavit of 
David S. Cook, Smiths1 counsel. (R. 1371-84) Additional 
memoranda were submitted by Smiths (R. 1482-1505; 1506-09) and an 
evidentiary hearing was held (R. 1514) at which Smiths and others 
gave testimony (Tr. 1756: p. 1-164) and at which it was 
stipulated that the Smith and Cook Affidavits and Smiths 
Interrogatory Answers would be considered as evidence the same as 
though the witnesses had so testified. (Tr. 1756: p. 104-06, 123, 
140-42) 
The Trial Court ruled on several motions (R. 1631), wrote 
three Memorandum Decisions (R. 1516-19; 1630-31; 1639-40) 
determining what adjusted indemnification awards would be made, 
and amended and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
(R. 1600-28) and an Amended Judgment (R. 1651-54) granting Smiths 
indemnification against Western for defense costs, denying 
Smiths indemnification for their costs of seeking 
indemnification. (R. 1630) 
Willard L. Smith was awarded $6,835.89 plus 10% interest 
from January 1, 1986. Keith C. Smith was awarded $8,470.00 plus 
10% interest from July 8, 1986. Smiths were awarded $20,127.07 
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attorney's fees and costs plus 10% interest from January 8, 1986. 
(R. 1651-54) 
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Judgment are Addendums II and III hereto. 
Western appealed from the Amended Judgment granted Smiths. 
Smiths appealed the denial of Smiths' expense of seeking 
indemnification. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Trial Court found the suit was brought against Smiths, 
independent CPA's, in their capacities as officer/directors of 
Western; the basic historical facts concerning Smiths past 
relationships to and services for Western and the basic facts 
pertaining to the contracts which provided for acquisition of 
the business by the purchasing employees. (R. 1602-06) 
The Trial Court found the facts respecting the 40-odd claims 
asserted against Smiths in the complaint, amended complaint, 
second amended complaint, pre-trial order and during the course 
of the trial (R. 1604, 1606-09); found that the relevancy 
asserted by Plaintiff's counsel as to the course of his lengthy 
trial examination of Bowerbank and Willard L. Smith was to 
determine whether Smith had breached his fiduciary duties to 
Plaintiffs (R. 1609); and found that substantial professional 
accounting service-type time was required of Smiths prior to and 
during the trial researching, furnishing and explaining 
accounting data related to various transactions and in connecting 
payments questioned by Plaintiff's counsel to the contracts. (R. 
609-10) 
The Court found that virtually all financial evidence 
produce at trial was originally prepared and located by Smiths; 
that payments to Bowerbank were summarized by Smiths, and that 
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Smiths summarized and categorized the funds flowing from Western 
to and for the benefit of the purchasing employees. (R. 1610) 
The Court found Smiths exercised their professional business 
judgment independently of Bowerbank in performing as officers and 
directors without person gain; that Smiths had adequately proved 
their claims for indemnification for professional accounting 
service time in preparing and presenting their defense and for 
their defense attorney's fees and costs; and that Smiths' time 
summary evidence showed their professional time for which claim 
was made was not charged to Western as regular accounting 
services and was reasonably expended in providing accounting 
explanations, data and factual accounting-type evidence necessary 
to Smiths' defense. (R. 1615-17) 
The Court found that Smiths' use of their own professional 
time to provide accounting data, summaries and exhibits in their 
own defense was more efficient and less costly than would have 
been the case had an outside CPA been hired because of Smiths 
familiarity with the records and transactions Plaintiffs put in 
issue (R. 1616); and that Smiths accounting explanations, 
accounting data and exhibits were necessary to Western's defense 
as well as to Smiths' personal defense and should be paid by 
Western in all events, but that such multiple usefulness did not 
take the actual economic expense to Smiths of preparing such out 
of the scope of the indemnification statute. (R. 1617) 
The Court found Western had adopted all the positions and 
defenses of Smiths and did not oppose Smiths' claims for 
indemnification with respect to Smiths' professional defense time 
taken by the litigation and Smiths' attorney's fees. (R. 1608) 
The court found Western had authorized indemnification of 
the four defendant directors, including Smiths, as to attorney's 
fees, costs and expenses. (R. 1617) 
The Court found Smiths had acted in good faith and in a 
manner which they reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to 
the best interests of Western; that neither of the Smiths 
diverted corporate assets or opportunities, competed with Western 
or engaged in self dealing or obtained any secret profits; that 
Smiths1 defense evidence was credible and refuted the claims 
asserted by Plaintiffs and adequately explained and correlated 
accounting data and checks paid to Bowerbank questioned by 
Plaintiffs; that Smiths1 evidence illustrated their 
professionalism and adherence to their duties as officers/ 
directors of Western despite considerable management 
difficulties; that Smiths' efforts kept Western solvent, growing 
and properly operating; and that independent proper business 
decisions were made despite the friction and lack of effective 
communication between the purchasing employees and Bowerbank. 
The court found Smiths were, in effect, successful on the 
merits or otherwise in defending against Plaintiffs1 charges 
because all claims against Smiths were dropped by Plaintiffs at 
the point of the mid-trial settlement and that such fact required 
Western to indemnify Smiths pursuant to Section 16-10-4(o)(3) UCA 
(1953) - now Section 16-10-4(2)(c) UCA (1953). (R. 1618-19) 
The Court found 194.5 hours of professional services were 
reasonably and necessarily expended by Willard L. Smith in his 
own and Western!s defense. The Court arrived at the 194.5 hour 
figure by deducting 5.9 hours from Willard L. Smiths time 
summary (R. 1696-1708) which were expended copying documents and 
doing work for Bowerbank. (R. 1619-20) The Court allowed the 
time expended by Willard L. Smith in summarizing his 
indemnifiable expense as reasonable indemnifiable expense. (R. 
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1620) 
The Court found 242 hours of professional services were 
reasonably and necessarily expended by Keith C. Smith in his own 
and Western's defense. (R. 1620) The Court arrived at the 242 
hour figure by deducting 28.2 hours from Keith C. Smith's time 
summary. (R. 1742-51) The Court found 4.2 hours benefited only 
Bowerbank and that 24 hours Keith C. Smith spent in court was 
necessarily expended since Willard L. Smith was present and 
testified on behalf of Smiths and Western. (R. 1620) The Court 
included in the allowed 242 hours the time expended by Keith C. 
Smith in summarizing indemnifiable expense as also reasonable 
indemnifiable expense. (R. 1620) 
The Court allowed Smiths only $35.00 per hour, the average 
effective hourly rate the Court found Smiths had charged Western 
for regular accounting services rendered in 1984 and 1985, 
disallowing the hourly rate enhancement resulting from Smiths' 
"flat rate" billing practice. (R. 1620-21) The Court found the 
rate enhancement arising from Smiths' "flat rate" billing 
practice (which resulting in an actual hourly return to Smiths of 
$51.86 per hour for normal accounting services) together with the 
savings to Western in not incurring the cost of paying other 
CPA's whom Smiths could have supervised, whose rates would have 
been much higher than $35.00 or $52.00 ($100.00 was Smiths' 
evidence) adequately reflected and took into consideration the 
value of the time Smiths would have expended in supervising 
another CPA to do Smiths/Western's accounting defense work that 
Smiths performed, which time the Memorandum Decision of the Court 
of Appeals suggested should not be considered recoverable expense 
under the indemnification statute. (R. 1622) 
The Court found Smiths had actually, reasonably and 
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necessarily incurred attorney's fees and costs for Smiths' 
defense (R. 1622); that Smiths counsel agreed to render legal 
services for just and fair rates; that Smiths had agreed to pay 
fair and reasonable legal rates; that evidence was submitted that 
$100.00 per hour was a just, fair and reasonable rate, consisting 
of proffered testimony of attorney Stephen Henriod, the opinion 
testimony of Smiths1 counsel, the oral concession of Western's 
counsel that $100.00 per hour was what he normally charges, and 
upon evidence suggesting $100.00 per hour was charged Western by 
its separate counsel, Bert Dart. (R. 1623) The Court found 
$100.00 per hour to be fair and reasonable considering the 
complexity of the factual and legal issues, the changing nature 
of the claims made, the difficult course the case had followed, 
the rates customarily charged for similar services and found that 
the legal defense work performed was reasonably necessary to 
adequately represent Smiths. (R. 1623-24) 
The Court found that 176.75 hours of legal services were 
necessarily expended respecting Smiths' defense from the 
commencement of the case through January 6, 1986 and that an 
additional 22 hours of legal services of a defensive nature were 
rendered on January 7th and 8th 1986, for a total of 198.75 hours 
for defense services for which the Court allowed $100.00 per hour 
- $19,875.00 together with reasonable out-of-pocket expenses 
customarily added to legal fees to that point of $252.07, making 
a total indemnification award for legal defense expense of 
$20,127.07. (R. 1624) 
The Court allowed Smiths pre-judgment interest on the 
indemnification awarded. (R. 1626, 1639-40, 1654) 
The Court refused to require Western to indemnify Smiths for 
the legal expense they incurred in seeking indemnification. (R. 
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1624-26; 1630). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Western use of Smiths1 defense services and 
indemnification agreement preclude Western from denying its 
responsibility to Smiths on appeal. 
2. Western's failure to marshal and demonstrate 
insufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's 
indemnity awards requires award affirmance. 
3. Sufficient evidence supports the awards for Smiths' 
professional accounting defense services which benefited both 
Western and Smiths. The $35.00 per hour rate allowed Smiths is 
supported by the evidence which fully justified a rate of $100.00 
per hour. The low rate adequately takes into consideration 
deemed non-indemnifiable supervisory time. 
4. The broad remedial purpose of the indemnification 
statute fully justifies treating Smiths' expert accounting 
defense services time as indemnifiable expense. The purpose of 
the statute is to encourage qualified persons to assume corporate 
stewardship positions by removing the threat of serious economic 
harm from litigation. Smiths were contractually appointed 
"balancing" officer/directors installed to insure performance of 
a de facto trust, and not regular full-time paid employees of 
Western, but independent CPA's dependent on their regular CPA 
practice for a livelihood. Smiths were successful on the merits 
or otherwise. Smiths provided expert defense accounting services 
more efficiently than could outside supervised accountants. 
5. Western must pay for Smiths' accounting defense services 
in any event because Smiths served Western's defense needs as 
experts, finding, producing and explaining accounting evidence 
essential to the proper presentation of Western's defense and 
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acted as de facto trustees for both purchasing employee 
Plaintiffs and for stock seller Bowerbank in accomplishing the 
purposes of what was in substance and effect a trust, and as de 
facto trustees demonstrated they acted properly in performing 
their trust duties. Western received benefit from Smiths1 
services which it appreciated, knew of and for which it promised 
payment. It would be unjust for Western to retain the benefit 
conferred without payment. 
6. Western's authorization of payment of indemnity to 
Smiths for their legal expense precludes Western from denying 
responsibility to Smiths on appeal. 
7. Smiths had to be defended to the point of the mid-trial 
settlement. The lower court's denial of legal expense time 
expended January 9, 1986 adequately offsets the obviously limited 
legal defense time expended in stating Smith's indemnification 
claims in the pleadings. The evidence fully supports the 
$100.00 per hour rate allowed. 
8. Smiths were properly allowed pre-judgment interest on 
awards based on fixed rules of evidence in accordance with known 
standards of value respecting professional accounting and legal 
services. 
9. Smiths' legal expense incurred in connection with 
enforcing their statutory right of mandatory indemnification is 
itself indemnifiable expense under a proper liberal 
interpretation of the indemnification statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WAIVER, ESTOPPEL AND THE PRINCIPLE THAT CLAIMS AND 
DEFENSES NOT RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL PRECLUDE WESTERN FROM DENYING 
ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO PAY SMITHS THE REASONABLE VALUE 
OF THEIR PROFESSIONAL TIME AND SERVICES DEFENDING 
SMITHS AND WESTERN AGAINST PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS 
Western urges this Court to reverse the indemnification the 
Trial Court awarded Smiths and award them nothing. (Western Brief 
p. 6-8) 
Western's position in the Trial Court (and for a time after 
the mid-trial settlement that led to control of Western shifting 
to Plaintiffs and their counsel) was the opposite. (R. 1608) 
Western did not oppose Smiths indemnification claims against 
Western at trial, nor by initial post-trial proffer or memoranda. 
(See R. 243-44 of the Pre-Trial Order statement of Western's 
position; Tr. 1183-1194 proffers made after the mid-trial 
settlement; and R. 492 and 517 consisting of memorandums filed on 
behalf of Plaintiffs which resisted Smiths' claims against 
Plaintiffs. No initial opposition memoranda was filed by 
Western.) 
Seven months into the case Western adopted a resolution 
authorizing indemnification of all four defendant directors 
against attorney's fees, costs and expenses in essentially the 
language of paragraph 5 of Section 16-10-4(o) UCA (1953). 
(Exhibit 1 p. 635-637) 
Having authorized and promised indemnification and having 
used Smiths' defense services rather than getting and paying 
outside CPA's for defensive accounting services, elementary 
principles of waiver and estoppel preclude Western from now 
claiming it has no responsibility to pay twice court-ordered 
indemnification for the modest reasonable value of Smiths' 
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professional services in Western's (and Smiths1) defense. 
Smiths justifiably relied on Western's acts, admissions, 
representations and silence in rendering defense services and 
will suffer injury if Western is allowed to repudiate its prior 
conduct on appeal* B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food, 754 
P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988); Rothey v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 754 
P.2d 1222 (Utah 1988); Larson v. Wycoff Co., 624 P.2d 1151 (Utah 
1981); and Arrowhead Constr. Co. v. Essex Corp., 662 P.2d 1195 
(Kan. 1983). 
Issues, defenses and factual claims not presented at trial 
cannot be considered on appeal. Interlake Co. v. Von Hake, 697 
P.2d 238 (Utah 1985); Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 (Utah 
1984); Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Wilken, 668 P.2d 493 (Utah 
1983); Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah 1983); Yost v. 
State, 640 P2d 1044 (Utah 1981); Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 
(Utah 1978); and Meyer v. Deluke, 457 P.2d 966 (Utah 1969). 
Subsection (3) of the indemnification statute, mandatory 
indemnification, was enacted primarily to protect vindicated 
officers and directors from a refusal to indemnify when, as here, 
an adverse shift in management has occurred. See Western 
Fiberglass v. Kirton McConkie and Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34, 37 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
POINT II 
WESTERN'S FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INDEMNITY AWARDS TO SMITHS FOR THEIR 
PROFESSIONAL DEFENSE WORK AND FAILURE TO DEMONSTRATE 
INSUFFICIENCY THEREOF REQUIRES AFFIRMANCE OF THE AWARDS 
Western's attack on the Trial Court's indemnity awards to 
Smiths for their professional defense services (Western's Brief, 
Argument I) ignores the Trial Court's specific findings that 
Smiths' work and efforts defended not only Smiths but Western as 
well (R. 1617); the fact Western used and benefited from Smiths' 
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less costly than outside CPA defense services (R. 1616); 
Western's agreement to indemnify Smiths (R. 1617-18); and the 
evidence supporting the modest awards made. 
Western's brief makes no efforts to marshal the supporting 
evidence nor to demonstrate insufficiency thereof to support the 
awards as is required of appellants attacking findings of fact. 
Williams v. Miller, 794 P.2d 23, 27 (Utah App. 1990); Doelle v. 
Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-79 (Utah 1989) and Grayson Roper 
Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989). 
The Trial Court's indemnity awards for Smith's defense 
services should therefore not be disturbed. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985). 
POINT III 
THE INDEMNITY AWARDS FOR SMITHS1 PROFESSIONAL DEFENSE WORK 
IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
Western's attack on the awards made for Smiths' professional 
defense services (Western's Brief - Argument I) ignores the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact, ignores the evidence which 
supports the Findings, distorts the prior remand decision of this 
Court and what the lower court did and falsely implies Smiths are 
seeking double payment. 
Western's current attack is as lacking in credibility as 
were Plaintiffs' 40-odd accusations against Smiths, Western (and 
Bowerbank) in the lower court proceedings. 
Western charges the Trial Court with having ignored a 
command of this Court to scrutinize and distinguish the types of 
work for which Smiths sought compensation and asks this Court to 
totally deny compensation for Smiths' defense services. 
The May 9, 1988 Amended Memorandum Decision of this Court 
said this Court could not determine whether the first awards made 
by the Trial Court were reasonable and that the basis of the 
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awards was unstated in the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision and 
Findings of Fact. In the "Considerations On Remand" portion of 
the Memorandum Decision, this Court said as to Smiths' services, 
the Trial Court should: (a) endeavor to distinguish between the 
types of work for which Smiths sought recover; (b) clarify the 
issues; and (c) specifically address Western's claim Smiths had 
billed Western only $13.00 to $15.00 per hour for normal 
accounting services while claiming $40.00 and $60.00 per hour for 
litigation services. (R. 1265-69) 
After remand, the Trial Court made three more memorandum 
decisions (R. 1516-19, 1630-31, 1639-40) and 62 detailed separate 
findings of fact. (R. 1600-29) 
As to the matter of distinguishing between the types of 
Smiths' defense work and placing the same in the various possible 
theoretical categories suggested by the Amended Memorandum 
Decision, long after the services were rendered, the first point 
Smiths make is that these categories did not suggest themselves 
to Smiths as necessary characterizations/categorizations of their 
work as they went along performing services. Therefore, the best 
Smiths could do after the Amended Memorandum Decision suggested 
categorization was necessary was to review again their time 
records in the form they were kept, which had been summarized for 
the Trial Court before and to endeavor to add such clarifications 
and amplifications as was then practicable and so they did. (R. 
1660-1752) 
The second point Smiths make is that in truth and reality 
Smiths were Western, spoke for Western, acted for Western, and 
explained for Western as well as themselves as far as defense of 
the suit was concerned. The Trial Court so found. (R. 1617) 
Western was a closely held corporation. Defendant Bowerbank 
20 
was the selling stockholder of Western's stock. He was selling 
the right of control and the business. Plaintiffs were buying 
the stock, the business and the right of control. Smiths were 
contractually appointed officers/directors whose expertise was 
needed to see Bowerbank got his money from Western's operations 
paid on behalf of Plaintiffs and that Plaintiffs' maintained a 
profitable operation, control of which would pass when 
Bowerbank's ownership interest was paid for in full. 
In every sense of the word Smiths functioned as Trustees, 
with duties to Plaintiffs and to Bowerbank. Plaintiffs and 
Bowerbank "were Western" from a real world economic ownership of 
a business standpoint. The fact the one man to become a five-man 
business was in corporate form was basically happenstance. The 
Trial Court, a seasoned lawyer with substantial practical 
experience in the legal and business world, (see Tr. 1181-82), 
understood that. 
Plaintiffs' frustrations in dealing with Bowerbank during 
performance of the contracts lead them to file suit attacking not 
only Bowerbank but also Smiths and virtually everything that had 
gone on from the inception of the contracts to events just before 
trial. 
Unanticipated, unprovided for vast amounts of Smiths' 
professional CPA time was taken in explaining, summarizing and 
showing the contracts were fair, claimed wrongful payments were 
contract justified and the like. Simple justice under any 
theory, indemnification being the most obvious, required Western 
to bear the reasonable cost of Smiths' work. 
Is that not the object of the legal system - delivery of 
simple justice rather than the fostering of artificial unhelpful 
complexity? 
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Under all the circumstances of this rather unusual fact 
pattern, the Trial Court saw fit to deny Smiths' compensation for 
only the portion of their time which appeared to the Trial Court 
to help only Bowerbank or to be unnecessary duplicate effort (R. 
1619-20), viewing the balance as necessary accounting defense 
work equally necessary to the defense of Western and Smiths. 
Competent, detailed evidence fully supports the Trial 
Court's finding that Willard L. Smith necessarily expended 
194.95 hours in his/Western's defense (R. 1619) and that Keith C. 
Smith reasonably and necessarily expended 242 hours in 
his/Western's defense. (R. 1620) (See Smiths' proffer of 
evidence, Tr. 1183-91; Smiths' Affidavits (R. 470-80; 481-91; 
1385-1481) Exhibits D-67 and D-68; Smiths' Expanded Time 
Summaries (R. 1696-1708; 1742-52); Smiths' testimony (Tr. 1756, 
p. 4-16, 27-29, 39-62, 73-78, 87, 102, 111-112, 145-48) and 
Smiths' sworn written Answers to Interrogatories (R. 1660-1708, 
1709-1754). 
There is no basis at all in the uncontradicted evidence 
which describes the time and services performed by Smiths for 
which the Trial Court allowed compensation, for concluding the 
Trial Court was manifestly wrong in viewing/characterizing/ 
finding Smith's work as compensable accounting/accounting 
related defense services. Claims, charges and 
mischaracterizations had to be answered and explained. It takes 
time to dig out, distinguish, evaluate, explain and furnish data 
and to prepare defensive testimony and exhibits. Smiths' work 
for which they sought and received compensation was of that 
nature. Smiths made no claim for approximately 65 hours time 
taken in reviewing new claims, organizing time summary data and 
reviewing suit documents. (Tr. 1756, p. 10) 
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The first assertion by Plaintiffs' counsel that Smiths 
regular accounting service billing rate was only $13.00 or 
$15.00 per hour was made after Smiths' proffered their evidence 
supporting their indemnification claims after the mid-trial 
settlement (Tr. 1192), after the trial closed and at a point when 
the expectation was proffers and submission of memoranda would be 
sufficient to enable the court to award appropriate 
indemnification. (See Tr. 1183-1193) 
It is common knowledge that office overhead alone is much 
more than $13.00 or $15.00 per hour and that professional CPA's 
charge $100.00 per hour and up, especially for litigation 
support services, so the inference Smiths should only get $13.00 
or $15.00 per hour for complex litigation defense accounting work 
and not even the modest $40.00 and $60.00 they were asking 
collapsed inherently, lacking credibility. 
Nonetheless, since this Court said there should be a 
specific finding as to Western's $13.00 - $15.00 contention, the 
Trial Court specifically addressed this matter in its new 
findings (R. 1620), which are not only supported but indeed 
compelled by Keith Smiths' detailed written analysis/explanation 
of Smiths' regular 1984 and 1985 accounting work billings to 
Western, which appears in his Affidavit and Exhibits thereto 
dated March 27, 1989 (R. 1385-1481) which he also explained 
orally. (Tr. 1756, p. 15-16) 
Smiths' analysis showed the average earned hourly rate for 
Smiths' professional CPA time involved in Smiths' regular 
accounting services to be $34.75 per hour in 1984 and $34.39 per 
hour in 1985 which the Court decided justified limiting Smiths to 
$35.00 per hour for their professional litigation defense 
services. 
Smiths' evidence further showed that Smiths time- worth 
billing method applied to regular 1984-85 services for Western 
resulted in average actual real earnings for the CPA time 
involved of $51.86 per hour. (R. 1387) Smiths' own and 
independent expert evidence was that $40.00 per hour for Keith 
Smiths time was minimally fair and $60.00 per hour for Willard 
Smiths time was minimally fair and that from an objective 
standpoint Smiths should be compensated at $100.00 per hour. (R. 
1288; Tr. 1756, p. 77-78, 147-148) 
Western produced no evidence to rebut Smiths' expert 
witness evidence that $100.00, or at least $40.00 (Keith Smith) 
or $60.00 (Willard Smith) per hour was objectively fair and 
reasonable. 
Clearly Smiths, rather than Western, are the parties injured 
by the extremely low rate allowed by the Trial Court. 
A comment in this Court's Amended Memorandum Decision 
suggests that had Smiths hired qualified experts to do the 
necessary defense accounting work and merely supervised them, 
Western could have avoided paying Smiths for their supervisory 
work. That proposition seems questionable in the context of this 
case where Smiths were not full-time employee officers/directors 
of Western, but CPA's with independent practices, serving as 
contractually appointed officers/directors, essentially as a 
courtesy, for only token compensation. 
Nonetheless, the Trial Court effectively denied Smiths 
compensation for the equivalent of deemed supervisory time in 
finding the difference between Smiths flat-rate billing method, 
which resulted in an actual hourly return to Smiths of $51.86 per 
hour, and the allowed $35.00 per hour, together with the savings 
to Western of not having to pay other CPA's whom Smiths could 
24 
have supervised, whose rates would have been much higher than 
$35.00 or $52.00 per hour (probably $100.00 per hour) adequately 
reflected and took into consideration the value of the time 
Smiths would have expended supervising others who might have been 
hired to do accounting defense work. (R. 1621-22) 
Western's Brief infers Smiths billed and were paid for all 
of their time, implying Smiths are seeking to double charge. 
Western's brief ignores the Trial Court's specific contrary 
finding (R. 1617) and its uncontradicted supporting evidence. (R. 
471, 482; Tr. 1184; Tr. 1756, p.49, 68) 
Western shows no lack of evidentiary support for the Trial 
Court's modest indemnity awards for Smiths professional defense 
work. The awards are supported by abundant detailed evidence and 
must be affirmed. Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURTfS CHARACTERIZATION OF SMITHS1 PROFESSIONAL 
TIME SPENT IN THEIR DEFENSE AS INDEMNIFICATION EXPENSE UNDER 
SECTION 16-10-4(o)(3) UCA (1953) NOW SECTION 16-10-4(2)(c) 
IS A PROPER APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE IN ACCORD WITH ITS PURPOSE 
The findings set forth the nature, scope and numerosity of 
Plaintiffs' claims against Smiths and Western (R. 1604, 1606-09), 
which included a claim Willard L. Smith was obligated to 
Plaintiffs to contribute $300,000 in additional capital. (R. 
1607) 
The court found substantial professional accounting 
services were required prior to and at trial researching, 
furnishing and explaining accounting data relating to various 
challenged transactions and connecting questioned payments to the 
contracts (R. 1610); that virtually all financial evidence 
produced at trial was originally prepared and located by Smiths; 
that Smiths had summarized all payments to Bowerbank and all 
payments made to the Plaintiffs (R. 1610); that Smiths were not 
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Bowerbank's alter egos but had exercised independent 
professional judgment as officers and directors (R. 1615); that 
Smiths had proved their claims for indemnification (R. 1615); and 
that Smiths use of their own professional time to provide 
accounting data, summaries and exhibits in their own (and 
Western's) defense was more efficient and less costly than would 
have been the case had an outside CPA been hired because of 
Smiths' familiarity with Western's records and the transactions 
Plaintiffs put in issue. (R. 1616) 
The Court found that Smiths' accounting explanations, 
accounting data and accounting exhibits were necessary to 
Western's defense as well as to Smiths' personal defense and 
should be paid by Western in all events, but that such multiple 
usefulness of the data did not take the actual economic expense 
to Smiths of preparing such out of the scope of the 
indemnification statute. (R. 1617) 
The Court found the indemnification statute should be 
liberally and broadly interpreted in light of its intended 
remedial purpose to encourage competent independent professional 
people, including CPA's, to serve as directors of corporations by 
removing the risk they will have to defend burdensome litigation 
at their own expense. (R. 1617) 
The Court found Western adopted an indemnification 
resolution after the suit was filed authorizing indemnification 
of the four defendant directors, which stated all had acted in 
good faith and in the best interests of Western in respect to the 
matters alleged in Plaintiffs' amended complaint (R. 1618); that 
Smiths had in fact acted in good faith and in the manner which 
they reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed to, the best 
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interests of Western (R. 1618); that Smiths were, in substance 
and effect, successful on the merits or otherwise in defending 
against Plaintiffs' charges (R. 1618); and such required Western 
to indemnify Smiths pursuant to Section 16-10-4(o)(3) UCA (1953) 
now Section 16-10-4(2)(c) UCA. (R. 1619) 
Section 16-4-10(o)(3) provides: 
(3) To the extent that a director, officer, 
employee or agent of a corporation has been successful 
on the merits or otherwise in defense of any action, 
suit or proceeding referred to in (1) or (2) of this 
subsection, or in defense of any claim, issue or matter 
therein, he shall be indemnified against expenses 
(including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably 
incurred by him in connection therewith. 
Termination of claims by agreement without payment or 
assumption of liability is "success on the merits or otherwise" 
under the indemnification statute. Wisener v. Air Express 
International, 583 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying the 
Illinois indemnification statute - substantively the same as the 
Utah statute). 
The results sought by Smiths, dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
claims, was achieved when the purchasing employees abandoned all 
claims against Smiths. Smiths were thus "successful on the 
merits or otherwise" in their defense within the meaning of 
subparagraph 3 of Section 16-10-4(o), Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
The "prevailing party" for purposes of an award of fees is 
the "successful party". The "successful" party is the one who 
obtains the result sought, even if by consent, in a suit in which 
no judgment is entered. See City Electric v. Industrial 
Indemnity Co., 683 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1984). 
Western argues the term "expenses" in the indemnification 
statute should be narrowly interpreted to preclude payment for 
the reasonable value of professional accounting defense services 
used in defending against serious charges instead of being put to 
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productive use and that only dollar costs paid by check should be 
deemed expenses. In the context of the facts of this case, the 
issue is whether the legislature intended essentially unpaid 
professional outside CPA directors of a small incorporated 
business to contribute all of their professional accounting 
service-type time required to prove their innocence and their 
good-faith adherence to their fiduciary duties while assisting 
both sides in a legal battle for control of a financially 
successful business. 
Three critical facts in this case, which do not often appear 
in suits brought against officer/directors are: 
First, Smiths had done all of the accounting work for the 
corporation, had possession of the facts and could more easily 
and efficiently produce and summarize the same for the benefit of 
the parties and the court and thus demonstrate the baselessness 
of Plaintiffs' claims than could new outside accountants. 
Second, Smiths were not full-time employees who were already 
being paid with regular salaries by the corporation. 
Third, Smiths were contractually appointed officer/directors 
to manage the corporation and insure performance of the stock/ 
business site sale contracts. 
If an officer or director is receiving his regular 
compensation while being sued, the only economic loss he will 
suffer is that of attorney's fees and court costs. It is just as 
much an expense to an outside professional person who continues 
to accrue office overhead and living expenses to contribute 
uncompensated time, unbillable to clients in the ordinary course, 
as it is to pay out cash for services while remaining employed by 
paying clients and thus earning an income. Professional time is 
money. Contributed/taken professional time is an actual expense 
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just the same as money earned by time and paid out is an actual 
incurred expense. Smiths' professional service time consumed 
defending the litigation was very substantial, not merely 
incidental - 270.50 hours on the part of Keith C. Smith (R. 470-
480) and over 200.85 hours on the part of Willard L. Smith (R. 
481-490). This equates to about three months of full-time 
professional work. 
Did the Legislature which adopted the indemnification 
statute to help attract capable professional management people 
intend that officer/directors receiving full-time salaries from 
their corporation should be preserved from substantial economic 
litigation loss for having agreed to so serve, but that 
officer/directors serving essentially pro bono would not be 
preserved from substantial economic litigation loss? Was it the 
Legislature's intent to help attract only full time paid 
directors but not part time virtually unpaid directors? Did the 
Legislature intend to subject professional CPA directors 
providing professional accounting defense services to substantial 
economic litigation loss but to preserve directors providing no 
such services from litigation loss? 
Utah's remedial indemnification statue is to be construed 
liberally with a view to effecting its object and promoting 
justice. Utah law on the construction of statutes is set forth 
in Section 68-3-2 UCA (1953): 
68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law 
liberally construed - Rules of equity 
prevail. 
The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no 
application to the statutes of this state. The 
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions 
and all proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect the objects of the 
statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is any 
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variance between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of 
equity shall prevail. 
Section 68-3-2 thus specifically and intentionally abrogates 
the common law approach to statutory construction in mandatory 
terms. In re Garr's Estate, 86 Pac. 757 (Utah 1906); Hammond v. 
Wall, 171 Pac. 148 (Utah 1918). 
To deny Smiths indemnity because they did not formally hire 
and then write checks to themselves, or to pretend they incurred 
no expense by assuming their professional time was worthless to 
them would be to utterly ignore the indemnification statute, 
defeat its object, and deliberately work severe injustice. 
In 1969 Utah amended its indemnification statute to enlarge 
indemnification powers. Utah was among the 26 states which 
adopted the comprehensive, broad indemnification provisions of 
the model business corporation act, including both enabling and 
mandatory provisions. Much discussion in the literature points 
out the desirability of attracting well qualified individuals to 
corporate directorships through providing safeguards to increased 
exposure to liability. See discussion in 31 The Business Lawyer 
4 p. 2123 (1976). The liberality with which the Court should 
consider indemnification is reflected in the language of 
subparagraph (2) of the statute which permits court-ordered 
indemnification even where the defendant is adjudged liable if, 
despite such adjudication in view of all circumstances of the 
case, the court determines such person is fairly and reasonably 
entitled to indemnity for such expenses as the court deems 
proper. 
The operative subparagraph in this case is subparagraph (3). 
Because the Smiths were successful they "shall be indemnified 
against expenses (including attorney's fees) actually and 
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reasonably incurred by (them) in connection therewith". They 
actually and reasonably incurred the expense of use of 
uncompensated professional accounting service time in their 
defense. The court found Smiths acted in good faith and in a 
manner each reasonably believed to be in the best interest of the 
corporation. The statute clearly authorizes and invites the 
court to do justice in the particular circumstances of each case. 
It is unfair, unjust, unreasonable and unnecessary to require 
professional persons, dependent on making charges to the general 
public for professional services, to abandon their regular 
livelihood for substantial periods of time to defend their 
actions against unfounded claims without payment for their time 
thus taken. Such violates due process of law and imposes 
involuntary servitude. 
The term "expenses" is defined neither in the Utah statute 
nor has such term been later defined in updated versions of the 
model business corporation act. See Model Business Corporation 
Act Annotated, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, 2d ed. vol. 1 Section 5 
(1971). The very fact said term has been given no limited 
definition and the statute uses the phrase "such expenses which 
such court shall deem proper" (subparagraph (2) 9f Section 16-10-
4(o)) indicates the court should use reasoned judgment as to 
indemnifiable expense with the purpose of the statute in view. 
The phrase "actually and reasonably incurred" appears in the 
statute. The Smiths acted reasonably and necessarily. Smiths' 
professional expert services produced the accounting data and 
facts defensively showing Western's affairs were in order, 
without which the case could not have proceeded as expeditiously 
as it did proceed and without which it probably could not have 
been settled. Smiths1 accounting work demonstrated both 
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Plaintiffs and Bowerbank received fair treatment under the 
contracts and that Western had suffered no loss, indeed had grown 
in value. 
The key relevant purpose/policy consideration underlying the 
indemnification section of the model business corporation act 
adopted by Utah and many other states as specifically recognized 
by this Court in Western Fiberglass, Inc. v. Kirton, McConkie and 
Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34 (Utah App. 1990), and by other courts, see 
e.g. Wisener v. Air Express International Corp., 583 F.2d 579 
(2d Cir. 1978) (Illinois statute) and Professional Insurance 
Company of N.Y. v. Barry, 303 N.Y.S.2d 556 (S.Ct. 1969) is that 
indemnity protection is necessary or desirable to encourage the 
recruitment of capable management executives and to allow 
corporation management to assume stewardship responsibilities of 
pursuing corporate activities unfettered by fear of taking good-
faith risks. Benefit to corporations comes from inducing 
valuable executives to serve by promising protection from 
unjustified litigation. 
Western relies on one lower federal district court opinion, 
Phillips v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc., 426 F.Supp. 208 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) which denied a former director the reasonable 
value of his services as attorney pro se defending himself in 
earlier shareholder derivative litigation. That decision was a 
lower federal district court decision applying its view of New 
York law. No mention is made in the decision as to whether New 
York has adopted Utah's standard that statutes in derogation of 
the common law are to be liberally, not strictly, construed. No 
mention is made in the opinion of the remedial purpose of the 
statute. The actual dispositive holding of that court was that 
Phillips' cause of action was clearly barred by a statute of 
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limitations. The additional opinion that pro se services were 
not indemnifiable expenses was obiter dicta totally out of 
harmony with the plain purpose of the indemnification statute and 
hardly "prevailing judicial thought" as Western's brief asserts. 
Further, the law suit defended was a shareholder derivative 
action in the right of the corporation in which the attorney 
represented only himself. 
Here, Western was a defendant whose own defense interests 
Smiths served along with their own. 
Western totally fails to justify the narrow, restrictive, 
unnecessary, unreasonable, unjust interpretation of the statute 
it urges. 
The Trial Court applied the corporation indemnification 
statute to the circumstances of this case respecting Smiths' 
accounting defense work in a manner consistent with its language 
and purpose as directed by Section 68-3-2 UCA (1953). 
POINT V 
IN NO EVENT IS WESTERN ENTITLED TO TAKE SMITHS EXPERT 
ACCOUNTING DEFENSE SERVICES WITHOUT PAYING FOR THEM 
The matters set forth under Points I, II and III above are 
incorporated as part of Point V. 
The Trial Court specifically found that Smiths1 accounting 
explanations, accounting data and accounting exhibits were 
necessary to Western's defense as well as to Smiths' personal 
defense and should be paid for by Western in all events. (R. 
1617) 
This Court presumes findings of facts to be correct because 
the trial court has the advantage of seeing and hearing the 
witnesses testify. 
Unless demonstrated to be clearly erroneous, findings of 
fact will not be set aside. If there is a reasonable basis in 
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the evidence, a trial court's award for damages will be affirmed 
on appeal. Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987). 
Besides being properly indemnifiable expense of Smiths1 own 
defense under the corporation code, Smiths defense services 
equally benefited and were equally defense services for Western 
and should be paid for by Western in all events for at least the 
following reasons: 
First, Smiths served Western's defense needs as expert CPA 
accounting witnesses. Their expertise was essential for the 
development and presentation of the case. When expert accounting 
evidence produced by expert CPA's is essential to the proper 
presentation of a case, and without which essential facts can 
not come to light, it is proper to award the fees of such 
experts as allowable court costs. Highland Construction Co. v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); cf. Frampton v. 
Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), and American Timber and 
Trading Co. v. Niedermeyer, 276 Or. 1135, 558 P.2d 1211, (Or. 
1976). 
This case is quite similar to Neese v. Richer, 428 N.E.2d 36 
(Ind. 1981) in which the trial court was held to have properly 
assessed the cost of a comprehensive accounting against the 
corporation along with court costs and attorney's fees since the 
accounting was very important in presenting and concluding the 
matters in litigation. 
Second, Smiths acted as de facto trustees for both the 
purchasing employee Plaintiffs and for the seller Bowerbank, in 
accomplishing the purposes of what was, in substance and effect, 
a trust. This fact brings this case within the principle that a 
trustee required to bear the cost of services for the trust or 
required to demonstrate he acted properly in performing his 
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duties has a lien on trust assets for reimbursement. Solimine v. 
Hollander, 129 N.J.Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (N.J.Eg. 1941). In 
Solimine, directors sought indemnification for expenses incurred 
in defending a stockholders1 derivative suit charging directors 
with negligence, mismanagement, diversion of funds and fraud and 
seeking an accounting and damages. The directors had been 
faithful to their trust and satisfactorily explained challenged 
transactions. Since the officers and directors had demonstrated 
loyalty and honesty to their trust, they were held entitled to be 
reimbursed by the corporate defendant for the costs incurred in 
connection with the litigation. The court held that exposure to 
charges of misconduct should not be deemed by the courts a hazard 
impliedly assumed by acceptance of office. 
The same is especially true respecting contractually 
appointed independent professional officers/directors serving 
essentially as trustees. In Solimine, the court said that when 
it is sought to charge a trustee with claimed negligence, 
mismanagement or fraud, or where his removal is sought for 
claimed misconduct and the trustee prevails, the expenses of his 
resistance are paid out of the trust estate and without inquiry 
as to the question of whether or not his defense benefited the 
trust. By defending the action, the executor or trustee is, in 
effect, sustaining the testator's intent the estate be 
administered by the hands into which it was confided. A trustee 
charged with misconduct equally with a director charged with 
misconduct owes a duty to stand his ground against unjust attack 
to demonstrate the honesty of his management. Public policy 
dictates that directors, like executors and trustees, should be 
encouraged to resist unjust charges in the confidence that 
ultimately their innocence will be established and they will be 
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reimbursed for the expenses of defense. Otherwise, responsible 
businessmen will be disinclined to accept directorships, 
especially when the emoluments of office are not commensurate 
with the risk of loss involved. Solimine observed that a right 
of reimbursement carries the virtue of discouraging strident 
stockholder litigation and held that the director's application 
for expenses should be made to the court in the original action 
as the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the 
matter. 
The Trial Court correctly applied the principles illustrated 
in Solimine to the facts of this case. 
Equally instructive is Estate of Gillman, 444 N.Y.S.2d 975 
(1981). Professional services were required in an effort to 
stabilize and improve the management of a closely held 
corporation owned by disagreeing family factions. A proceeding 
was filed to impress a constructive trust upon a widows exercise 
of a testamentary power of appointment on the basis such a trust 
would equalize and stabilize control of the corporation which had 
been profitable but which had commenced to suffer losses which 
were finally avoided because of the achievement of an overall 
settlement. The court held the professional services involved 
were valuable to the corporation and that the court had full 
authority to require the corporation to pay for them. The 
services included advice necessary to avoid or avert corporation 
actions inimical to the business success of the company which 
advanced prospects of long-range profitability. 
Smiths' services kept Western profitably functioning through 
the litigation. Smiths were not errant directors deserving of 
economic punishment. They functioned essentially as 
contractually installed trustees of a trust which they properly 
performed. 
Third, all of the elements of a quasi contract, a contract 
implied in law, are present: 
1. Western received a benefit. 
2. Western, at least throughout the trial court 
proceeding up to the point where control of Western passed to 
Plaintiffs and their counsel, used, appreciated, knew of and 
expected to pay for the benefit. 
3. It would be unjust for Western to retain the 
benefit without paying for it. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 
(Utah App. 1987). 
The measure of recovery under a contract implied in law is 
the value of the benefit conferred. Davies v. Olson, supra. 
The Trial Court granted a value of the benefit conferred 
recovery based not on the objective reasonable value of the 
Smiths' services, but on the lower actual rate of return realized 
by Smiths for their normal accounting services as billed in 1984 
and 1985. (R. 1620-22) 
It is Smiths, not Western, that should be complaining 
because of the Trial Court's refusal to allow all of Smiths' time 
and refusal to award the $100.00 per hour rate CPA's specifically 
hired for litigation normally charge. 
This Court should rectify that error and allow Smiths 
$100.00 per hour on the basis of the uncontradicted objective 
expert evidence $100.00 per hour was an objective and fair rate 
for their services. (Tr. 147-48) 
There is every reasonable basis in the evidence for the 
Trial Court's modest award to Smiths for their defense services, 
hence such award must be affirmed on appeal. Gillmor v. 
Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1987). 
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POINT VI 
WAIVER, ESTOPPEL, FAILURE TO RAISE DEFENSES IN THE 
TRIAL COURT AND FAILURE TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S INDEMNITY AWARD TO SMITHS 
FOR REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THEIR DEFENSE AND 
FAILURE TO ENDEAVOR TO DEMONSTRATE INSUFFICIENCY 
THEREOF REQUIRES AFFIRMANCE OF THE AWARD 
All of Smiths1 arguments, points and supporting legal 
authorities set forth under Points I and II above with respect to 
Western's appeal attack on the awards made for Smiths' defense 
accounting services are likewise applicable to Western's appeal 
attack on the attorney's fee award made to Smiths for legal 
services for their defense. The same are incorporated herein. 
POINT VII 
THE INDEMNITY AWARDED SMITHS FOR LEGAL SERVICES FOR 
THEIR DEFENSE IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
Western's attack on the indemnification awarded Smith for 
the legal expense and costs of their defense ignores the Trial 
Court's findings of fact and the detailed evidence which 
supports them, attempts to distort and mislead as to the clear 
record showing Plaintiff's continuous everchanging attack on 
Smiths clear to the point of the mid-trial settlement and 
misstates the evidence. 
In the "Considerations On Remand" portion of the Amended 
Memorandum Decision of this Court of May 9, 1988, it was 
suggested that the Trial Court should have endeavored to 
differentiate between legal services defending the law suit on 
behalf of Smiths and legal services in collecting Smiths' 
accounting fees. (R. 1268) After saying that, the Amended 
Memorandum Decision of this Court further states that this Court 
has "no insurmountable difficulty with the notion that fees 
reasonably incurred in obtaining the very indemnification 
provided by the statute might fairly be characterized as fees 'in 
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connection' with the defense for which indemnification is due". 
(R. 1268) 
Notwithstanding the latter comment, the Trial Court decided 
it was required to deny recovery of the considerable legal 
expense Smiths incurred after the mid-trial settlement in seeking 
initial and reassessed indemnification. 
That result really left Western with nothing at all of 
substance to complain about, so Western has resorted to 
mischaracterizing all of Smiths1 counsel services as merely 
seeking to collect indemnification and falsely claiming Smiths 
failed to prove required differentiation. 
Obviously the only legal service regarding seeking 
indemnification that was required of Smiths counsel up to the 
mid-trial settlement point was to keep that claim stated in the 
pleadings and in the pre-trial order. How much time did that 
take? That time was not separately broken out at the time, but 
it obviously takes very little time to state and restate claims. 
Defense services aiding Smiths defensively in "succeeding on 
the merits or otherwise" also qualified them for statutory 
indemnification. Legal services helping them succeed on the 
merits or otherwise by preparing to prove and proving via 
accurate reporting of accounting facts the baselessness of 
Plaintiffs' charges and Smiths actual adherence to fiduciary 
standards was certainly not seeking to collect accounting fees 
nor merely seeking indemnification. Smiths' successful defense 
automatically entitled them to indemnification. Western's 
position amounts to nothing more than the proposition that since 
Smiths proved they were entitled to indemnification, they don't 
get indemnification. 
The record keeping allocation suggested by this court 
certainly did not suggest itself to Smiths1 counsel as necessary 
as legal services were being rendered to Smiths. At no time 
during the litigation, or afterwards, did Smiths give accounting 
services bills to their counsel for collection. It was assumed 
Western would pay fair indemnification if Smiths were successful 
on the merits. Counsel for Smith recorded all legal services as 
they were rendered in the customary manner and recapitulated such 
services for the trial court in written form as evidence showing 
the legal services rendered to Smiths. (Ex. D-61, also at R. 463-
469; Tr. 1183) 
Smiths' counsel presented his own and Smiths' time summaries 
on January 9, 1986. (Ex. D-67 and D-68; Tr. 1183) 
The Trial Court denied recovery of the 13.5 hours of 
counsels time expended January 9, 1986 in trial preparation 
conferences, settlement negotiations and (after court 
adjournment) research respecting indemnification issues. (R. 461, 
1624) 
It was after the other parties arrived at a settlement on 
January 9, 1986 that the exhibits showing counsel's defense time 
on Smiths behalf and Smiths' time were offered and testimony was 
proffered regarding indemnification. (R. 1624; Tr. 1181-1984) 
Because the Trial Court disallowed all trial preparation 
time, conference time and settlement negotiation time on January 
9, 1986, Western has been allowed a de facto offset for whatever 
limited allowed pre-January 9, 1986 counsel time was utilized in 
stating Smiths' indemnification claims in the pleadings and pre-
trial order. 
None of counsel's defense services as recorded and outlined 
for the Trial Court from March 5, 1984 through January 8, 1986, 
the defense services time period allowed by the Court, show any 
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time at all on indemnification issues. (R. 461, 463-469) 
The first research on indemnification issues in preparation 
for the post-trial memoranda to be submitted respecting 
indemnification (Tr. 1192) was started late on the day of the 
mid-trial settlement - January 9, 1986. (R. 461) 
Western's assertion Plaintiffs were not really suing Smiths 
for anything they needed to defend against ignores the record to 
the contrary. The findings themselves summarize the claims 
asserted against Smiths in the pre-trial order (R. 1606) and the 
new ones made during the course of trial. (R. 1608) 
Western likewise ignores the evidence which fully supports 
the $100.00 per hour rate allowed (R. 457; Tr. 1185; R. 1373-74; 
Tr. 1756 p. 126) which the Trial Court referred to in its 
findings. (R. 1623) 
Western's counsel submitted no evidence to rebut Smiths' 
evidence $100 per hour was an objectively fair and reasonable 
commercial litigation defense rate. 
The award for defense legal services mandated by the 
indemnity section of the corporation code is supported, indeed 
compelled, by substantial competent evidence and therefore should 
not be disturbed on appeal. Rule 52(a) URCP, Doelle v. Bradley, 
784 P.2d 1176 (Utah 1989). 
POINT VIII 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST WAS PROPERLY ALLOWED 
ON THE INDEMNITY AWARDED 
The Trial Court allowed Smiths pre-judgment interest on the 
limited indemnity awards it made under the principles referred to 
by this Court in Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222 
(Ut.App. 1990). (R. 1640) 
The issue of when pre-judgment interest is allowed in Utah 
appears to have been first comprehensively addressed in Fell v. 
Union Pac. Ry. Co. , 88 Pac. 1003 (Utah 1907), a tort case for 
injury to sheep from negligent delay in transit. The trial court 
found the damages from death, shrinkage in loss and price and 
allowed legal interest from the date damages were demanded. The 
interest allowance was sustained on appeal because the damages 
were complete and the amount of loss fixed as of a particular 
time. The Supreme Court held the true test is not whether the 
damages are unliquidated, but whether the injury and consequent 
damages are complete and must be ascertained as of a particular 
time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known 
standards of value which the court must follow in fixing the 
damages rather than being guided by its judgment in assessing 
past and/or future injury based on elements not measurable by any 
fixed standards of value. Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 Pac. 
1003, 1007. 
Fell further said that general justice is never promoted by 
efforts to reach it by ignoring sound principles of law in 
particular cases; allowing interest is a mild way of offering a 
premium (cost) for withholding money; that there is no reason a 
person sustaining damages should not receive just what he has 
lost as nearly as such may be accomplished in a court of justice 
and that if at the time of injury plaintiff restores/replaces 
injured property with his own money he is entitled to interest on 
that money to the date of payment because if he had loaned the 
money to someone he certainly would be entitled to interest, and 
if he borrowed it from someone, he would likely have to pay 
interest for its use. So, by being awarding legal interest, he 
is simply placed in statu quo, nothing short of which is full 
compensation, which is what the law aims to accomplish. 88 Pac. 
1003, 1006, 1007. 
A? 
If Smiths borrowed to replace the income they lost doing 
defense accounting services for themselves/Western and to pay 
their counsel, surely they would have paid interest. By being 
awarded legal interest, they are placed in statu quo, what is 
surely what the law aims to accomplish. 
In Farnworth v. Jensen, 217 P.2d 571 (Utah 1950), a quiet 
title action and for possession, the Supreme Court said interest 
is the compensation allowed by law for the use, detention or 
forbearance of money or its equivalent and that interest by way 
of damages is allowed as damages for the unlawful detention of 
money, citing 30 Am. Jur. Section 2. 217 P.2d 571, 575. 
Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Ut.App. 1987) held 
the successful plaintiff in a breach of contract action entitled 
to pre-judgment interest notwithstanding failure to specifically 
plead or request it because the interest issue is injected by law 
into every action for the payment of past-due money. 
Western misconstrues Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 
1222 (Ut.App. 1990) by implying it restrictively redefined the 
circumstances under which pre-judgment interest is allowed to 
Western's view of a "fixed with accuracy" standard. 
Here the trial court did fix Smiths' awards with accuracy. 
Hours times modest rates measured by objectively measurable 
standards of value per hour equals accuracy. Smith v. Linmar 
denied pre-judgment interest under the facts of that case since 
the crop damage there at issue was "not ascertainable in 
accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of 
value". 796 P.2d 1222, 1226. 
Western cites not one authority to support the proposition 
that rates for professional accounting and legal services are not 
ascertainable in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and 
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known standards of value. 
Western cites Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d 229 
(Utah 1983) and Resner v. Northern Pac. Ry., 520 P.2d 655 (Mont. 
1974). 
In Jorgensen,, the Utah Supreme Court held a seller of sheep 
entitled to interest on the difference between what seller 
should have received and what he actually received, because 
regardless of variability of the weight of the sheep, seller's 
damages were mathematically calculated. 
Resner was a Montana wrongful death claim. The case holds 
that Montana tort claims do not bear interest until the amount 
of damages is determined by a judgment. The case does not at all 
illustrate any supposed general rule that interest is allowed 
only on judgments as Western claims. 
Pre-judgment interest runs from the date of the original 
judgment even when the award is amended in the course of or after 
appeal proceedings. Dursteler v. Dursteler, 733 P.2d 850 
(Id.App. 1987). 
The Trial Court clearly followed fixed rules of evidence and 
known standards of value in determining Smiths1 indemnity claims 
and was correct in allowing pre-judgment interest thereon from 
the date Smiths were "successful on the merits or otherwise", 
hence became entitled to payment, but were denied payment, of 
mandatory statutory indemnification. 
POINT IX 
SMITHS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER 
THE COST OF SEEKING INDEMNIFICATION 
Smiths sought recovery of their expenses in seeking 
indemnification from the Trial Court (see e.g. R. 1371-84, 1500) 
but the Trial Court denied recovery. (R. 1624-29; 1630) 
Smiths appealed the Trial Courts denial of this expense by 
Notice of Appeal dated August 15, 1990. 
Subparagraph (3) of Section 16-4-10(c), UCA (1953) uses 
mandatory terms requiring corporations to indemnify successfully 
defending officer/directors: 
". . . H E SHALL BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST EXPENSES 
(INCLUDING ATTORNEYS1 FEES ACTUALLY AND REASONABLY 
INCURRED BY HIM IN CONNECTION THEREWITH." (emphasis 
added) 
Smiths submit that legal expenses incurred in seeking the 
very indemnification for successful defense of a suit, action or 
proceeding which is mandated by the statute should certainly be 
deemed included in expenses "actually and reasonably incurred in 
connection therewith". (emphasis added) 
Substantial expense has been incurred by Smiths by reason of 
Western's refusal to pay the initial indemnification awarded and 
by reason of all the proceedings taken since by reason of 
Western's continuing refusal to pay. 
The Amended Memorandum Decision of this Court states that 
although the statute would not allow "an award of attorney's fees 
for matters beyond the scope of the statute having no correlation 
to the Smiths being named as defendants. . .", this Court had 
"no insurmountable difficulty with the notion that fees 
reasonably incurred in obtaining the very indemnification 
provided for by the statute might fairly be characterized as fees 
'in connection' with the defense for which indemnification is 
due". (R. 1268) (emphasis added) 
Certainly no part of the legal services rendered to Smiths 
were for matters "beyond the scope" of the statute having "no 
correlation" to Smiths being sued officer/director defendants. 
All services performed were rendered only because Smiths were 
wrongfully sued and have had to long pursue their right of 
indemnification in the same proceeding. 
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The case exactly in point is Professional Insurance Company 
of N. Y. v. Barry, 60 Misc.2d 424, 303 N.Y.S.2d 556 (S.Ct. 
1969), affirmed unanimously, 302 N.Y.S.2d 722. 
In that case, a sued director sought an allowance of his 
defense expenses pendente lite. The New York statute, in 
essentially the same grammatical terms as appear in subparagraph 
(3) of Section 16-10-4(o) provided for indemnification of "such 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees. . . as are 
necessary in connection with (the) defense". The corporation 
contended the legal expenses incurred in enforcing the director's 
right to indemnification were not includable expense under the 
statute because they were not necessary to the director's 
defense. The court did not agree and held such also should be 
indemnified, holding: 
Obviously if it were not for the action commenced 
. . . there would be no assertion. . . of rights to 
indemnification . . . . The allowance of expenses. . . 
is involved only where the corporation has failed to 
provide indemnification and it makes no difference 
whether the allowance is sought within the ambit of a 
derivative. . . or non-derivative. . . category as long 
as such allowance is necessary in connection with the 
defense in the litigation. The Statutory machinery 
set up. . . manifests this interpretation. The 
provision of Business Corporation Law. . . subdivision 
(c) has been described as a desirable policy expedient 
because of its tendency to encourage directors and 
officers to assume stewardship responsibilities. . . . 
303 N.Y.S.2d 555, 561. 
Utah's indemnification statute does not limit attorneys' 
fees to "only those" incurred in defending. The cost of seeking 
indemnification is "actually and reasonably incurred" expense "in 
connection" with the litigation defended. 
If Utah's indemnification statute is to be liberally 
construed with a view to effect its object and to promote 
justice, the interpretive standard mandated by Section 68-3-2 UCA 
(1953), its broad "in connection with" language must be construed 
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to cover the legal expense of seeking intransigently withheld 
indemnification. Otherwise burdensome legal expense will 
nevertheless have been successfully visited upon 
officers/directors Smiths who served conscientiously and in good 
faith and were successful on the merits or otherwise and the 
object of the statute will have been defeated solely by means of 
continued litigiousness. 
If Smiths must bear their costs of seeking and reseeking and 
defending and redefending their indemnification awards on appeal, 
they will not have been fully indemnified for their attorney's 
fees in connection with the litigation, but will be required to 
shoulder substantial personal economic loss, a result not 
intended by but contrary to the purpose of the indemnification 
statute. 
Contractual provisions allowing attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party are interpreted to allow recovery of attorney's 
fees incurred by reason of an appeal and no reason whatsoever 
exists for refusing to follow the same principle in this case 
where a statute allows fees to successfully defending 
officers/directors. See e.g. Rosenlof v. Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372 
(Utah 1984) and Jenkins v. Bailey, 676 P.2d 391 (Utah 1984). 
Smiths' counsel's affidavits and time summaries of legal 
services and legal costs incurred in seeking, obtaining, 
defending and further pursuing indemnification after the January 
9, 1986 mid-trial settlement through March 25, 1989 were 
submitted to and received by the Trial Court. (R. 456-62, 1371-
1384; Tr. 1756 p. 140-141) 
Smiths' counsel testified and was cross examined concerning 
the same and respecting the additional 34.5 hours of services 
rendered through the date of an evidentiary hearing held 
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September 13, 1989. (Tr. 1756 p. 123-140) 
Additional services continued to be necessary after the 
September 13, 1989 hearing as shown by the record of proceedings 
since then, including appeal proceedings. 
The cross-examined undisputed evidence presented to the 
lower court concerning Smiths' costs of seeking, obtaining, 
defending and seeking reassessed indemnification to September 13, 
1989 is in the record before this Court, along with the evidence 
supporting the lower court's finding with respect to a reasonable 
hourly rate. (R. 456-62, 1371-1384; Tr. 1185-86; Tr. 1756 p.123-
141) 
The facts concerning such services are not in material 
dispute so that the effect thereof becomes a question of law this 
Court can determine. Cf. Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87 
(Utah App. 1990) 
Smiths therefore ask this Court to determine a reasonable 
Attorney's fee and costs for seeking indemnification based on 
such evidence to September 13, 1989. 
This case should then be remanded for the limited purpose of 
determining what additional award for legal expense should be 
made respecting Smiths' ongoing expenses respecting collection of 
indemnity since that time. Cf. Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 662 
(Utah 1985) 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's indemnity awards for Smiths' defense 
accounting services should be increased from the $35.00 per hour 
award to $100.00 per hour. In any event, the awards made should 
be affirmed. 
The lower court's indemnity award for the legal cost of 
Smiths' defense should be affirmed. 
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The trial court's allowance of pre-judgment interest should 
be affirmed. 
The lower court's refusal to allow Smiths their legal 
expenses incurred in enforcing Smiths' right of indemnification 
was an error of law that should be reversed. 
This court should determine what legal fees/costs of 
seeking indemnification should have been awarded by the trial 
court for the services of Smiths' legal counsel from January 8, 
1986 through September 13, 1989 and direct the entry of a 
judgment for that amount and remand the case for the limited 
purpose of determining what further award should be made for the 
services of Smiths' counsel since that time, including services 
on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED/this, / / day of April, 1991. 
DAV?D T . C O O K , Attorney for 
Defendants, Appellees and 
Cross Appellants 
Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith 
Served the foregoing Brief by mailing four copies thereof to 
James A. Mclntyre, Attorney for Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc., 
360 East 4500 South, Suite 3, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-0280, 
this /'? - day of April, 1991 j \ 
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ADDENDUM I 
SECTION 16-10-4(0), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) 
(o)(l) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any 
person who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party 
to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or 
proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or 
investigative (other than an action by or in the right of the 
corporation) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, 
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was 
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, 
employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint 
venture, trust or other enterprise, against expenses (including 
attorney's fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in 
settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection 
with such action, suit or proceeding if he acted in good faith 
and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to 
the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any 
criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to 
believe his conduct was unlawful. The termination of any action, 
suit or proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction, or 
upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of 
itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good 
faith and in a manner which he reasonably believed to be in or 
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and with 
respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable 
cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful. 
(2) A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person 
who was or is a party or is threatened to be made a party to any 
threatened, pending or completed action or suit by or in the 
right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by 
reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, 
employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the 
request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or 
agent of another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust 
or other enterprise against expenses (including attorney's fees) 
actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with the 
defense or settlement of such action or suit if he acted in good 
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not 
opposed to the best interests of the corporation and except that 
no indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue 
or matter as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be 
liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his 
duty to the corporation unless and only to the extent that the 
court in which such action or suit was brought shall determine 
upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but 
in view of all circumstances of the case, such person is fairly 
and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such expenses which such 
1 
court shall deem proper* 
(3) TO THE EXTENT THAT A DIRECTOR, OFFICER, EMPLOYEE OR 
AGENT OF A CORPORATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL ON THE MERITS OR 
OTHERWISE IN DEFENSE OF ANY ACTION, SUIT OR PROCEEDING REFERRED 
TO IN (1) OR (2) OF THIS SUBSECTION, OR IN DEFENSE OF ANY CLAIM, 
ISSUE OR MATTER THEREIN, HE SHALL BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST EXPENSES 
(INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES) ACTUALLY AND REASONABLY INCURRED BY 
HIM IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, (emphasis added). 
(4) Any indemnification under (1) or (2) of this 
subsection (unless ordered by a court) shall be made by the 
corporation only as authorized in the specific case upon a 
determination that indemnification of the director, officer, 
employee or agent is proper in the circumstances because he has 
met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in (1) or (2) of 
this subsection. Such determination shall be made by the board 
of directors by a majority vote of a quorum of the directors, or 
by the shareholders. 
(5) Expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal 
action, suit or proceeding may be paid by the corporation in 
advance of the final disposition of such action, suit or 
proceeding as authorized in the manner provided in (4) of this 
subsection upon receipt of an undertaking by or on behalf of the 
director, officer, employee or agent to repay such amount unless 
it shall ultimately be determined that he is entitled to be 
indemnified by the corporation as authorized in this section. 
(6) The indemnification provided by this subsection shall 
not be deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those 
indemnified may be entitled under any bylaw, agreement, vote of 
shareholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to 
action in his official capacity and as to action in another 
capacity while holding such office and shall continue as to a 
person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or 
agent and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and 
administrators of such a person. 
(7) A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain 
Insurance on behalf of any person who is or was a director, 
officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was 
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, 
employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint 
venture, trust or other enterprise against any liability 
asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity or 
arising out of his status as such, whether or not the corporation 
would have the power to indemnify him against such liability 
under the provisions of this subsection. 
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Subparagraph (3) above as restated in the 1987 revision of 
the indemnificarion statute reads as follows: 
(c) TO THE EXTENT THAT A DIRECTOR, OFFICER, 
EMPLOYEE, OR AGENT OF A CORPORATION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL 
ON THE MERITS OR OTHERWISE IN DEFENSE OF ANY ACTION, 
SUIT OR PROCEEDING REFERRED TO IN SUBSECTION (2) (a) OR 
(b), OR IN DEFENSE OF ANY CLAIM, ISSUE, OR MATTER 
THEREIN, HE SHALL BE INDEMNIFIED AGAINST EXPENSES, 
INCLUDING ATTORNEYS' FEES, WHICH HE ACTUALLY AND 
REASONABLY INCURRED IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. (emphasis 
added) 
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ADDENDUM II 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Dated April 18, 1990 
DAVID S. COOK 
Attorney for Defendants Smith 
R5 West 400 North 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Telephone: 292-7216 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT, 
VAL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES, 
and DANIEL WAYMAN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
'WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO., INC., 
a Utah corporation, and WILLIAM 
W. BOWERBANK, JONATHAN BOWERBANK, ] 
KIM BOWERBANK, WILLARD L. SMITH, 
KEITH C. SMITH, 
Defendants. ] 
) FINDINGS OF FACT 
) AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Case No. C84-924 
! (Judge Dean E. Conder) 
This matter was tried before the Court on December 10th, 
11 th and 13th, 1985 and again on January 8th and 9th, 1986. On 
January 9th, 1986, the Plaintiffs and Defendants, Western Auto 
Radiator Co., Inc., William W. Bowerbank, Jonathan Bowerbank and 
Kim Bowerbank advised the court they had agreed to a settlement 
of the issues among those parties, the terms of which were stated 
for the record and the terms of which were incorporated in a 
stipulation between those parties dated January 31, 1986 on file 
herein. 
The Court reserved the issue of the Smiths' claim for 
indemnification for their professional CPA time and for their 
attorney's fees. 
Evidence was proffered upon said issues on January 9, 1986 
and thereafter affidavits and memorandum were submitted. 
The Court ruled on said reserved issues on May 5, 1986 and 
on May 8, 1986 signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
judgment against Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. only. 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. appealed the judgment. The 
Utah Supreme Court referred the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, which issued a Memorandum Decision on March 16, 1988 
and, following a Petition for Rehearing, a second Amended 
Memorandum Decision on May 9, 1988, in which the Utah Court of 
Appeals remanded the case for such reassessment of the judgment 
as might be appropriate and for the entry of more detailed 
findings of fact. 
Following remand, Defendants Smith responded to a motion 
made by Western for release of the supersedeas bond substitute 
and responded to written discovery requests made by Western and 
as part of their responses annexed comprehensive summaries of 
services. Additional sworn written evidence was submitted by 
Smiths in the form of an Affidavit of Keith C. Smith dated March 
27, 1989 and Affidavits of David S. Cook dated March 27, 1989 and 
September 12, 1989. 
The parties submitted additional memoranda and on September 
13, 1989 an evidentiary hearing was held at which testimony was 
taken and at which it was stipulated in open court that the 
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affidavits and supporting documents submitted by Smiths could be 
received in evidence, the same as though the witnesses had so 
testified. 
The case having been fully submitted and argued and the 
Court having considered the evidence and memoranda submitted by 
the parties and good cause appearing, the Court now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Suit was brought against Willard Smith and Keith Smith 
in their capacities as officers/directors of Western Auto 
Radiator, Inc., also named $ defendant. 
2. Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith are independent 
certified public accountants who maintain offices in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
3. Willard L. Smith operated Western Auto Radiator Co., 
Inc. on a full time basis for fifteen years prior to the time 
William Bowerbank became its operating manager. 
4. Willard L. Smith, with the assistance of Keith Smith as 
to recent years work, prepared all Western's financial 
statements and tax returns. 
5. Smith assisted with the tax planning that was part of 
the 1977 preferred stock sales agreement and 1982 common stock 
sales agreement between Plaintiffs as buyers and Defendant 
William Bowerbank as seller, and the 1982 building sales 
contract between Bowerbank as seller and Western as buyer, issues 
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concerning which were involved in the litigation. 
6. The accounting and bookkeeping services performed for 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. by Willard and Keith Smith 
included providing bookkeeping and accounting services in 
respect to the performance of said contracts. Willard Smith and 
Keith Smith functioned as President and Secretary of Western 
Auto Radiator, Inc. for -relat-i-vely small salaries of $2,000 and ""Tr"^ -
$500"-per year respectively-?—a**d—£•&€—per mooting—#e*—attendance '\ *• 
at meetings of its Board of Directors. 
7. Smiths were named officers and directors of Western in 
the January 2, 1982 Common Stock Sales Agreement. Willard L. 
Smith had served continuously as a director for Western from the 
time of its incorporation in 1966. 
8. In December 1977, four of Western's key employees, 
plaintiffs Blaine Goodrich, David L. Hoyt, Val G. Kidman and 
Sterling C. Jones, entered into an agreement with William W. 
Bowerbank, who at that point owned all of the issued and 
outstanding stock of Western, to purchase all of his preferred 
stock for $200,000.00 payable on agreed terms over a term of 10 
years. 
Western agreed to pay each purchaser a monthly bonus 
sufficient to enable him to make his monthly payment. These 
employees were given an option to buy all of Bowerbank's common 
stock for $100,000.00 at the end of the 10-year period. 
9. In January 1982, the same four employees and one 
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additional employee, plaintiff Daniel Wayraan, entered into a 
modification of the 1977 agreement with Bowerbank under which 
they agreed to purchase his common stock for $100,000.00 payable 
as in the agreement provided. 
Western agreed to pay monthly bonuses to the 5 purchasers 
sufficient in amount to enable them to make the monthly payment. 
10. The 1982 agreement provided that 5 officer/directors, 
and one additional director, would manage Western and implement 
the agreements: Blaine Goodrich, Secretary and Director; Daniel 
Wayman, Director; Bowerbank's son, Jonathan Bowerbank, Vice 
President and Director; Bowerbank!s son, Kim Bowerbank, Vice 
President and Director; Willard L. Smith, who had been the full-
time manager of Western for several years prior to Bowerbank1s 
assuming management as President and Chairman of the Board of 
Directors; and Keith C. Smith as Treasurer and Director. 
11. The 1982 agreement further provided Western would 
furnish Bowerbank an automobile, fringe benefits, and could use 
his services as a consultant for certain compensation. 
12. At or about the time the 1982 agreement was signed a 
Consulting Agreement was also signed by Bowerbank and Western, 
under which Bowerbank agreed to participate in and report on 
industry conventions, report observed variations from Western's 
standard operating procedures and advise and consult with 
Western's Board of Directors for $500.00 per month. 
13. Under an additional January 1982 agreement, Bowerbank 
5 
•J J 
sold Western the land and building long occupied by Western for 
payments as therein provided. 
14• Western continued to operate profitably and bonuses 
were accrued to the purchasing Plaintiff employees and the amount 
thereof was paid to Bowerbank through accounting procedures 
administered by Directors Smith. 
15. The purchasing employees grew resentful of Bowerbank1s 
continued observations and demands and in February 1984 filed 
these proceedings against Western, Bowerbank, Bowerbank's two 
director sons and Smiths, asserting Bowerbank would not permit 
Plaintiffs to control Western: that certificates showing more 
shares of preferred stock had been delivered to them than the 
corporation had issued to Bowerbank; that such certificates were 
ultra vires or watered stock; that an accounting was necessary 
and sought an order compelling Bowerbank to deposit his common 
stock with the clerk of the court. 
16. By Amended Complaint, the purchasing employee 
Plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that Bowerbank's director 
sons and defendants Smith had fraudulently diverted Western's 
assets; permitted Kim Bowerbank to purchase a Western vehicle for 
less than its value; had Western provide insurance for the 
automobile after it was sold; had Western sell a Western vehicle 
to Jonathan Bowerbank for less than its value; had Western 
provide insurance and repairs for the automobile after it was 
sold; had Western provide health insurance to Jonathan Bowerbank 
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and had paid Willard L. Smith $2,000 per year and Kim Bowerbank 
and Jonathan Bowerbank $1,000 per year and Keith Smith $500 per 
year as director's fees without having received any services from 
them as directors. 
The Amended Complaint further charged Willard Smith and 
Bowerbank with having changed the stock purchase payment date, 
causing Western to pay funds to Bowerbank early and claimed that 
the January 1982 Consulting Agreement was kept secret from 
Plaintiffs; that Bowerbank, through Directors Smith, had 
wrongfully excluded the purchasing employees from managing 
Western; and that directors Bowerbank and Smith had conspired to 
issue watered stock, 
17. Later in the litigation, the purchasing employees filed 
a Second Amended Complaint alleging that a number of Western 
checks were improperly paid to Bowerbank; that director Willard 
L. Smith conspired with Bowerbank to set the price for 
Bowerbank's land and building above market value and demanded the 
contract price be reduced or judgment be entered against Willard 
L. Smith for $155,000,00. 
18. In the Pre-Trial Order, the Plaintiff purchasing 
employees claimed defendant Willard L. Smith, Bowerbank and an 
attorney had represented that Plaintiffs would be purchasing 
200,000 shares of preferred stock for $1.00 per share and 100,000 
shares of common stock; that the purchasing employees should have 
an accounting of all payments made to Bowerbank under the 1977 
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and 1982 agreements; that payments had been doubled requiring a 
recomputation of interest; that Bowerbank or Willard L. Smith 
were obligated to contribute additional capital to Western at the 
rate of $1.00 per share for 300,000 shares; that the land and 
building price should be reduced; that the Consulting Agreement 
should be rescinded; that directors Smith and Bowerbank had 
functioned merely as William Bowerbank's alter egos and had 
breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs in various respects 
and had not earned their director's fees. 
19. Director/Defendants Smith responded to Plaintiffs 
various claims by asserting there had been no representation that 
there were 200,000 shares of preferred stock or 100,000 shares of 
common stock; that incorrect certificates should be corrected; 
that all contract payments had been properly made as required by 
the contracts; that the land and building contract was fairly 
negotiated in good faith and was more favorable to Western than 
had Western continued to rent; that the Consulting Agreement was 
entered into in good faith and that Western had received value 
therefrom; that Smiths were not, in fact, the alter egos of 
William Bowerbank and had, throughout their services as directors 
and officers, acted properly and had not permitted anyone to 
convert or wrongfully take or use Western's property; that Smiths 
had earned the modest director's fees paid them and raised other 
defenses and claimed right of indemnification for reasonable 
charges for their professional time consumed in preparing 
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accounting summaries and data required by the litigation in 
their defense and for the legal expense of their defense. 
20. Western adopted, by reference, all of the positions and 
defenses of Smiths and did not oppose Smiths' claims for 
indemnification with respect to Smiths1 professional time 
consumed by the litigation and attorney's fees. 
21. During the 2 1/2 days of trial before the mid-trial 
settlement reached by Plaintiffs and William Bowerbank, 
Plaintiffs, through their counsel, in the course of examining 
first William Bowerbank and then Willard L. Smith from a 700 page 
2 volume exhibit, asserted in effect that Willard Smith had 
incompetently failed to perform his duties as officer, director 
and accountant and had breached his fiduciary duties by 
permitting Bowerbank to raid Western's treasury^ unfairly imposing 
agreements on Plaintiffs and controlling Western's operations. 
Plaintiff implied Smiths had Western make improper loans to 
Bowerbank without authorization of Western's Board of Directors 
and/or without paying interest and/or without repayment; that 
Smiths had Western pay too much building rent to Bowerbank; that 
dividends were improperly paid to Bowerbank by aid of Smiths; 
that Bowerbank was given improper double payments by Smiths on 
his stock purchase contract; that Smith improperly had Western 
pay Bowerbank a salary; that the purchasing employees were 
coerced by Smith to enter into the Common Stock Sales Agreement; 
that secret meetings were held by Smiths to which plaintiff 
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purchasing employee directors Goodrich and Wayman were not 
invited; that there was impropriety or error on the part of Smith 
in the original stock issued to Bowerbank in exchange for 
Western's beginning business assets; that Smith breached his 
fiduciary duty by purchasing an automobile that Western was 
obligated to provide Bowerbank for cash rather than on credit and 
that Smith had acted improperly with respect to loans, 
dividends, consulting fees and rent paid by Western to Bowerbank; 
that Smith's participation in developing the Stock Purchase 
Agreements was contrary to Plaintiffs1 interests; that Smith 
structured such Agreement unfairly to Plaintiffs and that Smith 
had kept Plaintiffs unaware of the agreements or the meaning or 
operation thereof; that Smith had made accounting errors in some 
of Western's financial records; that the purchasing employees 
were improperly excluded by Smith from board meetings; that 
Smith breached his fiduciary duty by allowing Bowerbank to select 
the automobile Western agreed to furnish Bowerbank in 1983 and 
other claims. 
22. The court made inquiry as to the relevance of the 
examination of Plaintiffs' counsel in view of the statement of 
issues contained in the Pre-trial Order and was advised that 
Plaintiffs' trial approach was to determine whether Defendants 
Smith had breached their fiduciary duties to Plaintiffs. 
23. The first day of trial was consumed by Plaintiffs' 
counsel asking William Bowerbank questions about numerous checks 
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in a 700 page Exhibit lr the implication being that Smiths had 
assisted Bowerbank in improperly diverting funds from Western. 
That night Keith Smith prepared a comprehensive accounting 
showing all of the checks that had been issued by Western to 
Bowerbank which tied the checks into the contracts. 
24. Substantial professional accounting service type time 
was required of Smiths, prior to and at the trial researching, 
furnishing and explaining accounting data relating to various 
transactions and connecting payments questioned by counsel for 
the purchasing employees to the contracts. 
25. Virtually all financial evidence produced at trial was 
originally prepared and located by Smiths. (See e.g. TR 822-
42,846-47 876-76 and Exhibits 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46 and 47. 
Payments to Bowerbank were summarized by Keith Smith in 
Exhibit 37. (TR 872-1081). 
Smiths1 summary of funds flowing to the purchasing employees 
was made Exhibit 39. (TR 875). 
26. Willard L. Smith testified concerning the background 
and history of Western, including his management thereof on a 
full-time basis for 15 years commencing in 1942. He testified 
that Western's tax returns and other financial records, regularly 
and routinely were furnished to the Board of Directors, including 
the director purchasing Plaintiff employees and that the same 
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clearly, continuous and correctly showed the number of shares 
issued and outstanding. 
27. Smith further testified that the scope of his 
management responsibilities included oversight of wage levels, 
working with employees, management of cash flow; review, analysis 
and working through business problems and preparation and 
analysis of monthly, quarterly and annual financial statements; 
he testified that under his direction Western grew from a net 
worth of approximately $280,000 in 1976 to a net worth of 
approximately $620,000 in 1985 and that Western had increased 
profits during the performance of the Stock Purchase Agreements 
even when incurring the additional expense of adding the bonuses 
which funded the stock purchase agreements to the purchasing 
employees' already substantial salaries; and that Western's 
retained earnings grew from $51,000 in 1977 to approximately 
$240,000 on March 31, 1985. 
28. Smith testified concerning and explained the facts and 
circumstances in respect to the payments to William Bowerbank 
challenged by Plaintiffs and explained the purpose for, and value 
and fairness to Western (and to Plaintiffs), of the business 
premises purchase agreement and consulting agreement. He 
described a number of instances in which he and Bowerbank had 
strongly disagreed and Smith's position as Western's chief 
operating officer had been implemented as Western's business 
decision. 
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29. Willard Smith prepared Exhibit 47 showing how the stock 
certificates were in error and should be corrected and explained 
it made no difference whether the purchasing employees were 
buying 19,590 shares or 300,000 shares because all of Western's 
business was included in the purchase. 
30. The purchasing employee who testified, Blaine Goodrich, 
conceded, on cross examination, that he had the stock books in 
his possession and subject to his access and review at all times; 
that he signed the erroneously prepared preferred stock 
certificates as secretary of Western; that minutes he, himself, 
had prepared showed that the financial condition of Western had 
been discussed and reviewed; that he had discussed the company's 
financial condition on many occasions with Willard Smith and had 
access to Western's checks and bank statements as they were 
received at the corporation's place of business, which he 
managed; that he had never been forbidden to make inquiries or 
reviews in respect to financial matters and had served 
continuously on Western's Board since its incorporation and was 
authorized and did sign Western's checks and had done so since 
the late 1960's; that his compensation for services was a 
function of Western's profits which required them to be 
calculated annually; that he was aware of the treatment of bonus 
payments as payments made on the Stock Purchase Contracts; that 
he had signed the Articles of Amendment creating two classes of 
stock which correctly recited the number of shares issues and 
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outstanding and had full opportunity to review the Articles of 
Amendment and agreed the amount of Western's stated capital in 
terms of preferred stock shares was not significant to him, as 
all of Western's business was in effect included in the purchase 
contracts. Goodrich conceded that all of the purchasing 
Plaintiff employees had discussed entering into the Stock 
Purchase Agreements. Minutes he prepared recited numerous 
meetings had taken place regarding that subject matter in which 
financial data had been reviewed; and showed that he had sought 
and received independent legal advice; that the Plaintiffs had 
authorized Willard Smith to negotiate an appropriate purchase 
agreement with respect to the corporation's place of business 
with William Bowerbank; that the purchasing employees had never 
asked Western's Board of Directors to reevaluate the building 
purchase contract; that all other matters of which complaint 
was made in the suit had never been brought to the Board of 
Directors; and that the basic reason the Plaintiffs had filed 
suit was to gain control of Western through litigation and to 
avoid the necessity of continuing to deal with Bowerbank. 
31. During the course of the third day of trial, the trial 
court strongly suggested to the purchasing employee Plaintiffs 
and William Bowerbank that a settlement should be made. William 
Bowerbank and Plaintiffs, with the acquiescence of Western, which 
was represented by independent counsel, and Bowerbank1s two 
director sons, worked out a settlement on January 9, 1985, the 
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terms of which were stipulated in open court and later reduced to 
writing. The settlement involved the Plaintiffs employees 
withdrawing and abandoning all claims, including those asserted 
against Smiths. The settlement agreement provided that the 
purchasing employees would vote in a new slate of directors upon 
receipt of the common stock under the terms provided in the 
Settlement Agreement, and did so, replacing Smiths. 
32. No agreement was made with Smiths as to their claim for 
indemnification, but it was agreed and provided in an Order 
stipulated by all counsel, including counsel then representing 
Western, and counsel for the purchasing employees, that the Court 
would determine such matter, based on the evidence thus far heard 
and upon proffers of evidence and memoranda to be submitted by 
counsel for the purchasing employees and by counsel for Smiths. 
33. Additional evidence was proffered by Smiths, which 
proffer was accepted by the Court with the consent of counsel for 
the purchasing employees. 
34. Smiths proffered evidence, and the Court finds, that 
meetings held with Kim Bowerbank and Jonathan Bowerbank and Keith 
Smith after the latter became officers/directors were intended to 
acquaint them with Western's financial condition and functioning; 
that such meetings were not held with any intent of excluding 
anyone or making any secret arrangements; that numerous 
conferences, formal and informal were held with Blaine Goodrich 
in which the financial and other affairs of the company were 
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discussed; that Willard Smith had never gained the impression 
from Blaine Goodrich that he had questions or problems or matters 
of concern which were unaddressed concerning Western's 
operations; that the wages paid to the purchasing employees were 
higher than the wages paid by competing companies and that, not 
only bonuses, but amounts equal to the taxes payable on 
additional bonuses were accrued by Western to the accounts of the 
purchasing employees, so their acquisition of the stock of 
Western would be on a favorable cost-free basis. 
35. Smiths further proffered evidence, and the Court finds, 
that Smiths exercised their professional business judgment 
independent of William Bowerbank in performing their duties as 
officers and directors without personal gain. 
36. Smiths proffer included evidence adequately proving 
their claims for indemnification for professional accounting 
service time in preparing data for their defense and attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in their defense. Smiths presented time 
summaries which were later supplemented by additional time 
summaries and Smiths' Affidavits showing their professional time 
and that it was not charged to Western as accounting services and 
that it was reasonably expended in providing accounting 
explanations, data and factual accounting-type evidence 
necessary to Smiths' defense. 
37. Smiths said professional time—could and would otherwise 
have been employed by them in providing professional services to 
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paying clients in the oourco of Smitho*—accounting/GPA practice, 0* V 
Smit&s-J—proffer was,—and the Court finds,—they could havo charged >^ 
relatively modoGt—ratoo—si—from—$40*00—fee—$75.00—per hour—§er 
such time. 
38. Smiths could have hired an- expe-rt CPA at their expense -s^*^ 
to review and analyze Western ls—aceount-ing records—and history * ^v 
and - to -provide accounting— explanations-* data—aftd—factual \* 
accounting type evidence —in -Smiths' --defense-*—and had thoy done % 
so, such expense would, - under-the—circumstances—of—this—case 
outlined above, clearly -iiave -been- recoverable—expense—ei—their 
defense within the intent,- scope- and—meaning of the 
indemnification section -of—the-corporat-ion- Code. 
39. Smiths use of their own professional time to provide 
accounting data, summaries and exhibits in their own defense was 
more efficient and less costly than would have been the case had 
an outside CPA been hired, because of Smiths1 familiarity of 
Western's records and the transactions Plaintiffs put in issue. 
40. —There- is -no—legal—or — faetual—justification—for ^Tr*^ 
interpreting/ applying—the indemnification section of the *'\ ^ 
Corporation ~ Code unfavorable—to—Smiths—because—they—in—effect 
hired themselves less- expensively--than-^ -iir'-i-ng an outside CPA to 
prepare—aooouftte-ing data for their defense. 
41. The -economi-c -expense--to—Smirths—of—losing the market i ^ ^ 
*} \ 
value-of-tiieii: own -professional--^ irae-irnr-providing accounting data y/ T:^  
for -their-own defense- isr~the—eeenomic—and—legal—equivalent of 
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incurring the-expense of hiring a CPA to do the same thing. 
42. Smiths' accounting explanations, accounting data and 
accounting exhibits were necessary to Western's defense as well 
as to Smiths personal defense and should be paid by Western in 
all events. However, such multiple usefulness of data does not 
take the actual economic expense to Smiths of preparing such out 
of the scope of the indemnification statute. 
43. The Court finds the indemnification statute should be 
liberally and broadly interpreted in light of its obvious 
intended remedial purpose which is to encourage competent, 
independent professional people, including CPA's to serve as 
directors of corporations by removing the risk they will be 
exposed to burdensome litigation expense which they are involved 
in because of their services as directors and which they 
successfully defend, or in respect to which they show good-faith 
adherence to their duties. 
44. Smiths' professional CPA time consumed by the 
litigation in their defense was not billed to, or paid by, 
Western in the course of Smiths providing their regular 
accounting services to Western during the course of litigation. 
45. After the suit was filed, Western's Board of Directors 
adopted a resolution by majority vote (the two Plaintiff 
Directors voting against it) authorizing indemnification of the 
four Defendant Directors, including Smiths as to attorney's fees, 
costs and expenses. This resolution stated that all of the 
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Defendant Directors acted in good faith and in the best interests 
of Western in respect to the matters alleged in the purchasing 
employees Amended Complaint. This resolution required repayment 
to Western of any amounts advanced unless it should be ultimately 
determined that the directors were entitled to be indemnified. 
46. Each of the Defendants Smith acted in good faith and in 
a manner which he reasonably believed to be in, or not opposed, 
to the best interests of Western. 
47. Neither of Defendants Smith diverted corporate assets 
or opportunities; competed with Western in any way and neither 
engaged in any self dealing or obtained any secret profits. 
48. Because of the mid-trial settlement between Plaintiffs 
and William Bowerbank which terminated the litigation and 
included dismissing all claims against all parties including 
Smiths, it was not necessary for the Court to make findings of 
fact and conclusions of law respecting Plaintiffs' claims 
against Smiths. The Court does find that Smiths' evidence, 
including their testimony, was credible and basically refuted the 
claims asserted by Plaintiffs against them and adequately 
explained and correlated accounting data and checks paid to 
Bowerbank questioned by Plaintiffs. 
49. Directors Smiths were, in substance and effect, 
successful on the merits or otherwise in defending against 
Plaintiffs' charges against them because all claims against them 
were dropped by Plaintiffs at the point of the mid-trial 
001X18 
settlement. Such fact requires that Western indemnify Smiths 
pursuant to Section 16-10-4(1)(3) U.C.A. (1953) (prior to 1987 
amendments - now Section 16-10-(4)(2)(c) U.C.A.)• 
50. Smiths1 evidence illustrated Smiths' professionalism 
and adherence to their duties as officers/directors of Western in 
the face of considerable management difficulties and that Smiths' 
efforts kept Western solvent, growing and properly operating and 
independent proper business decisions were made, even with 
friction and lack of effective communication between the 
purchasing employees and William Bowerbank. 
51. The Court has reviewed the affidavits, time summaries 
and other evidence submitted by Smiths in respect to the C.P.A. 
time expended in their defense and in the defense of Western and 
finds that 194.95 hours of professional services were reasonably 
and necessarily expended by Willard L. Smith, in his own defense 
and Western's defense. The Court has arrived at said 194.95 hour 
figure by deducting from the Willard L. Smith expanded time 
schedule which shows a total of 200.85 hours, the following: 
A. 0.9 hours in September 1985 respecting copying 
documents for William W. Bowerbank. 
B. 1.00 hour expended October 1985 copying documents 
for William W. Bowerbank. 
C. 2.00 hours of work in December 1985 for Mr. 
Bowerbank. 
D. 2.00 hours September 1985 copying vouchers, which 
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tne court finds 10 be work which could have been performed by 
secretarial help. 
The Court has included in said 194.95 hours the 11 hours 
shown on page 13 of the Willard L. Smith Time Summary annexed to 
his Interrogatory Answers dated January 17, 1£89 because the 
Court finds the time/expense of summarizing the indemnifiable 
expense also reasonable indemnifiable expense. 
52. It appears from the evidence that 242.00 hours of 
professional services were reasonable and necessarily expended by 
Keith C. Smith in his own defense and in defense of Western. The 
Court has arrived at said 242.00 figure by deducting from the 
Keith C. Smith Expanded Time Summary annexed to his Answers to 
Interrogatories dated January 17, 1989, the following: 
A. 4.2 hours November 28, 1985 which the Court finds 
was work benefiting only defendant William Bowerbank. 
B. 24 hours Court time December 1985 which the Court 
finds was not necessarily expended in his own defense since 
Willard L. Smith was also present in Court and could and did 
testify on behalf of both Smiths and Western. 
The Court has included in said 242.00 hours the 12.5 hours 
required to summarize the indemnifiable expense because the Court 
finds such also reasonable indemnifiable expense. 
53. The hourly rate of compensation at which Smiths should 
be indemnified, the Court finds to be the sum of $35.00 per hour. 
Smiths calculated this rate had been effectively charged Western 
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for professional C.P.A. time in providing Western's usual 
accounting services, except for the effect of Smiths1 "flat rate11 
billing practice. (See Affidavit of Keith C. Smith dated march 
27, 1989 and Exhibit "A" annexed thereto, showing an average of 
$34.76 for 1984 and $34.39 for 1985, which the Court has 
determined should be reasonably rounded to $35.00). 
54. The Court finds that the custom/practice of parties for 
a long period of time should prevail in determining a reasonable 
hourly rate, there being no other evidence of agreement as to 
rates. 
55. Willard L. Smith's allowable 194.95 hours times $35.00 
per hour is $6,823.25. To this figure should be added 
secretarial time of 2 hours at $6.32 per hour for $12.64, giving 
a total of $6,835.89 due Willard Smith as indemnification for 
the expense to him of his professional CPA time consumed in 
providing financial evidence in defense of Plaintiffs1 charges. 
56. Keith C. Smith's allowable 242.00 hours times $35.00 
per hour is $8,47 0.00 due Keith C. Smith as indemnification for 
the expense to him of his professional CPA time consumed in 
providing financial evidence in defense of Plaintiffs' charges. 
57. The Court finds that the time value difference in 
Smiths "flat rate" billing practice, which normally resulted in 
an actual average hourly return to Smiths of $51.86 per hour and 
the rate the Court has allowed of $35.00 (approximately $17.00 
per hour difference), which difference is roughly equivalent to 
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the difference between $35.00 per hour and the rate Smiths would 
have charged paying clients for their time - $40.00 to $75.00 per 
hour - together with the savings to Western in its not being 
faced with paying other C.P.A.'s whom Smiths could have 
supervised, whose rates would have been much higher than $35.00 
or even $52.00 per hour ($100.00 per hour is suggested by Smiths1 
evidence) adequately reflects and takes into consideration the 
value of the time Smiths would have expended in supervising 
another C.P.A. to do necessary defense accounting data and 
summary work on behalf of Smiths/Western, which time/value the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests should not be considered 
recoverable expense under the indemnification statute. 
58. Smiths actually, reasonably and necessarily incurred 
attorney's fees and costs for Smiths' defense of this matter. 
59. Oral evidence, affidavits and time/expense summaries 
have been submitted showing the legal services rendered to Smiths 
in connection with their defense in this matter through the date 
of the mid-trial settlement between Plaintiff and William 
Bowerbank and with respect to seeking Smiths1 indemnification, 
including indemnification for legal services in post-settlement 
proceedings and in connection with the appeal taken by Western 
and in post-appeal proceedings relating to the indemnification 
issues and the motion made by Western for the release of its 
supersedeas bond substitute; in evaluating the decisions rendered 
by the Court of Appeals; reviewing and analyzing the 
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interrogatories received from Western directed to the Smiths and 
preparing, revising and completing answers and assembling 
material for submission to the Court with respect to the 
indemnification issues, including out-of-pocket expenditures 
normally billed to clients in matters of this kind. 
60. The Court finds that Smiths' counsel has agreed to 
render legal services for just and fair rates and that Defendants 
Smiths have agreed to pay and are obligated to pay their counsel 
fair and reasonable legal rates for his services. 
61. Evidence has been submitted that $100.00 per hour is a 
just, fair and reasonable rate of compensation for the services 
of Smiths1 counsel in this complex and difficult litigation. 
Said evidence consists of the proffered testimony of attorney 
Stephen Henriod; the opinion testimony of Smiths' counsel and 
the oral concession of Western's counsel that $100.00 per hour is 
what he normally charges and upon evidence in the records 
suggesting that $100.00 per hour was charged Western by its 
separate counsel, Bert Dart. 
62. The Court finds said rate to fair and reasonable 
considering the complexity of the factual and legal issues 
presented by this case, the changing nature of the claims made 
and the difficult course this case has followed after the mid-
trial settlement and on appeal and post-appeal. The Court finds 
the rate of $100.00 per hour is consistent with the rates 
customarily charged in the area for similar services, and that 
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the work performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
represent Smiths, both in their defense and in seeking 
indemnif ication. 
63. The Court finds that 176.75 hours were necessarily 
expended respecting Smiths' defense through January 6, 1986 and 
that an additional 22 hours of legal services of a defensive 
nature were rendered on January 7 and 8, 1986, making a total of 
198.75 hours for defense services to that point, for which a 
reasonable indemnification award for attorney's fees is 
$19,875.00 together with reasonable out-of-pocket expenses, 
customarily added to legal fees, to that point in the sum of 
$2 52.07, making total indemnifiable defense expense for 
attorney's fees and costs to that point the sum of $20,127.07. 
64. An additional 358.80 hours have—-beef*—necessarily *\ 
expended by—SmithsJ—-counsel™ifi—rendering—services—related—to ~f^ L **, ' 
VNV 
obtaining-and- defending-i-ndemni-fieat-i-on—for- the Smiths both as to \ 
their time and- as—to--their— legal—expense—after—the—mid-trial 
settlement between - other---parties—in—obtaining and defending the 
initial award on appeal, requesting that the—case be reheard and 
resisting Western's motion-for release - of— its—supersedeas bond 
substitute —and— -reviewing—and—analyzing—the—Interrogatories 
received from Western directed Smiths -post-appeal—and—in 
preparing Answers in response -thereto-and in- assembling material, 
including affidavits, and memoranda for submission to the trial 
court with-respect to the indemnification issues. 
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6 5. Said—services—would—not—have—been—neuessaiy—btrt—f or 
Western' s action in contesting- indemrvi-fieateion- and—the—amount -JL 
thereof after control of Western passed-to~PlaintiffG ooon after V N 
the - point of the- -mid-trial— -setetelementr-----between—Plaintiffs—and 
r C 
\ 
William-—Bower bank—In--which--the- late-ter—agrood—Plaintiffs—eeuld 
select—their—own~Board—of—Slreeteors for Western. Western filed 
the appeal and additional- motions- - post --appeal—and—otherwise 
continued -to- resist—Smiths?—legit-imate—Indemnification—claims, 
thus creating the necessity--the- Smiths—continue—fee—incur—legal 
expense in-seeking indemnification. 
66. The Cour-t -f-inds—all—sueh—additional—legal—expense 
reasonably incurred in connection —with—-obtaining—the—very . \_ 
indemnification -provided —for- —a—-corporate officer/director V 
V 
successful on the - merits—or—otherwise—in—defending—against—an 
actual proceeding- brought—against -him—by—reason of the fact that 
he was a director, officer-, -employee-or^-agent of the corporation, 
within the scope, intent and fair - meaning—of—Section—16 10-
4 (o) ( 3 ) Utah Code Annotated- (1953) as- that—section stood at the 
time this action-was--filed. 
67. The Cou-r-t—finds-t-hat—tee-deny—indemnification for legal _>. 
services- and~costs-of - obtaining—ifidemnif icatien->—including those
 r V v 
rendered—on—appeal -and -post- -appea-li—so-as -to effectively require \ ^ y 
Smiths—te—bear- and—pay—such—expensed s—contrary—to—the plain 
intent—of~~±he indemnification—statute-- wh-ieh—is—tee—remove—the 
burden of litigation expense from corporate-offleers-?—directors 
26 
and agents—successful on—the—meriirs-;—or—uLheiwise,—in—their 
defense. 
68. A reasonable attorney1 3 fee for such—additional 
services^—at- -said—rate—of—$4^-0.00—-per—hour,—is—the—sum—of 3 \^ 
\ ^ 
recoverable—the- -additional—out-of-pocket—expenses—incurred in 
connection -with such—additional—services—In the sum of $875.37, 
making—-the total— --additionally recoverable legal expense, 
i ne ludi ng^—the —expense of-—seeking indemnification through 
Septen^ er'-ieT-l-^ B^ ^^ t-he-sum-^ f -$-36,755.37. 
69. The Court does not find that Plaintiffs asserted 
unmeritorious claims against Smiths in bad faith, and for that 
reason finds the provisions of Section 78-27-56 (U.C.A.) not 
applicable to Smiths1 claims for legal expense. 
70. The Court finds and rules that the indemnification 
expense award to which Willard L. Smith has been found entitled 
in the sum of $6,835.89, the indemnification expense award to 
which Keith C. Smith has been found entitled in the sum of 
$8,470.00 and the indemnification award to which Smiths are 
entitled for reasonable attorney's fees and costs for their 
successful defense in the sum of $20,127.07 should bear interest r. 
at the legal rate of 10% per annum compounded annually from the V. 
time such indemnification should have been paid, to wit: January 
8, 1986. 
71. In contemplation of law, Western's statutory duty to 
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pay indemnification became fixed at least by that time. Smiths ^R 
entitlemex^ fe—was t.hen complete and—reasonable known standards of \ v.* 
value-have -been -followed by-~*he—Court-—and—eould—have—been % 
followed by Western in paying -indemnification.—To al-l-ow interest '<| 
on amounts awarded- -simply -place—the -Smiths—in—statu—gue—and 
nothing -short- of - allowing—-interest--would—give—them—proper 
indemnrfieatrion- HE or—'thei~r—defense—expenses—contemplated by—the 
indemnification -statute. 
72 . The—Gou^t—-f-i-nds—and—rules—that—the—indemnification -y^ . 
expense award to which Smiths are entitled -for-—reasonable *-) 
attorney's fees and other legal expense -incurred—in—seeking ^c^*/ 
indemnification, including services through Western's appeal and 
post-appeal proceedings in the sum of $36,755.37—should bear 
interest at -the legal rate -of 10% per annum compounded—annually 
from the time of post-trial evidentiary hearing on—September 13, 
1989 by which date the Court finds such additional—expense- was 
due. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Defendant Willard L. Smith is entitled to judgment 
against Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. for indemnification for 
his professional C.P.A. time/expense in his defense in the sum of 
$6,835.89 together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% 
per annum from January 8, 1986 compounded annually. 
°f 
.5,„..$<., «..y..-.r- .. ^  ^ . ^ 
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2. Defendant Keith c. Smith is entitled to judgment against 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. for his professional C.P.A. 
time/expense in his defense in the sum of $8,470,00 together with 
interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% per annum from January 
8, 1986 compounded annually. "^^ 
3. Defendants Smiths are entitled to judgment against 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. for the legal expense Smiths 
reasonably incurred in their successful defense in the sum of 
$19,875.00 plus costs of $252.07 together with interest on said 
sums at the legal rate of 10% per annum from January 8, 1986 
compounded annually. 
4. Def-endan-fes—Smiths—are—en-ti t led - ~ta~~3-udgme**fe—ag^ ins t 
r 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. for Smiths reasonable attorney! s ^ ^ *
 v 
V V 
fees a-ad---associated- legal --expense incurred in seeking V 
indemnification including defending the - appeal—taken by Western 
and in post-appeal proceedings in the sum of $36,-~75S-r3: -^^ feogether 
with interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% per~~annum from 
September 13, 1989 compounded annually. 
±±-MADE AND ENTERED this / & day of / ( Q^\_ f 19*0. 
J 
BY THE COURT: 
( 
jL. ' f- s
 M,/ 
DEAN &• CONDER 
District Judge 
Served the foregoing form of Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law by mailing a copy thereof to James A. 
Mclntyre, attorney for Plaintiffs, 360 East 4500 South, Suite #3, 
Murray, Utah 84107, this j'p day of February, 1990. 
T)SUL*t~- /&. ^0-OIC, 
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ADDENDUM III 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Dated April 18, 1990 
Filed July 25, 1990 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 2 5 1990 
DAVID S. COOK #0715 
Attorney for Defendants Smith 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
Telephone: 292-7216 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN' AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BLAINE GOODRICH, DAVID HOYT, 
VAL KIDMAN, STERLING JONES, 
and DANIEL WAYMAN, 
) AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
WESTERN AUTO RADIATOR CO,, INC., ) 
a Utah corporation, and WILLIAM ) 
W. BOWERBANK, JONATHAN BOWERBANK, ) 
KIM BOWERBANK, WILLARD L. SMITH, ) Case No. C84-924 
KEITH C. SMITH, ) (Judge Dean E. Conder) 
Defendants. ) 
This matter was tried before the Court on December 10th, 
11th and 13th, 1985 and again on January 8th and 9th, 1986. 
Plaintiffs Blaine Goodrich, David Hoyt, Val Kidman, Sterling 
Jones and Daniel Wayman were represented by James A. Mclntyre 
#2196, 360 East 4500 South, Suite Three, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84107-0280, Telephone 266-3399. Defendant Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. was represented by Bert L. Dart #818, 310 South Main, 
Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Telephone 521-6383. 
Defendants William W. Bowerbank, Jonathan Bowerbank and Kim 
Bowerbank were represented by Michael F. Heyrend #1480 and Thomas 
P. Melloy #3664, Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Suite 
IjdsJi! 
ooirsi 
1200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, Telephone 363-3300. Defendants 
Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith were represented by David S. 
Cook #715, 85 West 400 North Bountiful, Utah 84010, Telephone 
292-7216. 
On January 9th, 1986, the Plaintiffs and Defendants 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc., William W. Bowerbank, Jonathan 
Bowerbank and Kim Bowerbank advised the court they had agreed to 
a settlement of the issues among those parties, the terms of 
which were stated for the record and the terms of which were 
incorporated in a stipulation between those parties dated January 
31, 1986 on file herein. 
The Court reserved the issue of the Smiths' claim for 
indemnification for professional C.P.A. time and for their 
attorney's fees. 
Evidence was proffered upon said issues on January 9, 1986 
and thereafter affidavits and memorandum were submitted. 
The Court ruled on said reserved issues on May 5, 1986 and 
on May 8, 1986 signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a 
judgment against Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. only. 
Western Auto Radiator Co., Inc. appealed the judgment. The 
Utah Supreme Court referred the case to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, which issued a Memorandum Decision on March 16, 1988 
and, following a Petition for Rehearing, a second Amended 
Memorandum Decision on May 9, 1988, in which the Utah Court of 
Appeals remanded the case for such reassessment of the judgment 
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as might be appropriate and for the entry of more detailed 
findings of fact. 
Following remand, Defendants Smith responded to a motion 
made by Western for release of the supersedeas bond substitute 
and responded to written discovery requests made by Western and 
as part of their responses annexed comprehensive summaries of 
services. Additional sworn written evidence was submitted by 
Smiths in the form of an Affidavit of Keith C. Smith dated March 
27, 1989 and Affidavits of David S. Cook dated March 27, 1989 and 
September 12, 1989. 
The parties submitted additional memoranda and on September 
13, 1989 an evidentiary hearing was held at which testimony was 
taken and at which it was stipulated in open court that the 
affidavits and supporting documents submitted by Smiths could be 
received in evidence, the same as though the witnesses had so 
testified. 
The case having been fully submitted and argued and the 
Court having considered the evidence and memoranda submitted by 
the parties, and having heretofore made and entered Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, 
JUDGEMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED against Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. and in favor of Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith as 
follows: 
1. Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. in favor of Willard L. Smith in the sum of $6,835.89 
3 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from 
January 8, 1986 simple interest. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. in favor of Keith C. Smith in the sum of $8,470.00 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from 
January 8, 1986 simple interest. 
3. Judgment is hereby entered against Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. in favor of Willard L. Smith and Keith C. Smith in the 
sum of $20,127.07 attorney's fees and costs for Smiths' defense 
together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from 
January 8, 1986 simple interest. 
The address of the judgment debtor, Western Auto Radiator 
Co., Inc. is 567 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
The Employer I.D. Number of Defendant Western Auto Radiator Co, 
Inc. is 87-0272096. 
MADE AND ENTERED effective the 18th day of April, 1990. 
J^  BY THE COURT: 
/ 
\ - , . / ^ ^ 
DEAN E. CONDER, 
District Judge 
Served the foregoing form of Amended Judgment by mailing a 
copy thereof to James A. Mclntyre, Attorney for Plaintiffs, 360 
East 4500 South, Suite Three, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-0280, 
this ^ day of July, 1990. f)Z>r., A (sfiAr 
CO 
